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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Should the Utah Supreme Court deviate from the appellate

procedure of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD") in cases
involving the sanction of public reprimand issued by its Ethics and Discipline
Committee?
2.

Assuming the Utah Supreme Court does deviate from the appellate

procedure of the RLDD, should attorneys in cases before the Ethics and
Discipline Committee be required to exercise reasonable diligence to timely raise
claims of error such as a claim of bias?
3.

When there is no evidence that an Ethics and Discipline Committee

member has knowledge of a potential conflict, should bias be implied?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
For all the above issues, this is a case of first impression with respect to
the standard of review for attorney discipline sanctions of public reprimands (or
admonitions) imposed by the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline
Committee.

Pursuant to the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, the

standard of review for sanctions imposed for professional misconduct in attorney
discipline actions before the state district courts is a correctness standard and
the Utah Supreme Court may make an independent judgment regarding the
appropriate level of discipline if the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951
P.2d 207 (Utah 1997).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Rule 14-510, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. The rule is set
forth verbatim in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This is a petition for review of the Ethics and
Discipline Committee's imposition of a public reprimand against Travis Bowen for
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Course of Proceedings: In January 2006, Bowen appeared for hearings
before a Screening Panel of the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline
Committee. After the hearings, the Screening Panel made findings and
conclusions concerning Bowen's professional misconduct and recommended
that he receive discipline in the form of a public reprimand.

Bowen filed an

exception to the Screening Panel's recommendation of discipline, which was
heard by the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee in June 2006. The
Chair

denied

Bowen's

exception,

adopted

the

Screening

Panel's

recommendation of discipline, and issued the order of public reprimand against
Bowen. Bowen filed a Petition for Judicial Review of Administrative Order in the
District Court in July 2006, followed by a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The
District Court dismissed Bowen's petition and denied the request for a
preliminary injunction.

Bowen filed a Petition with this Court on October 20,

2006. The OPC responded with a memorandum in opposition. On November
29, 2006, the Court ordered the parties to brief their respective positions.
Disposition at Trial Court or Agency: Bowen received a public
reprimand from the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In January 2006, Bowen appeared for hearings before a Screening Panel
of the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee. The hearings
involved several informal complaints against Bowen alleging professional
misconduct.

See Affidavit of Diane Akiyama ("Akiyama Affidavit"), a copy of

which is provided in the Addendum, U 4. 1 Bowen was represented by counsel at
the Screening Panel hearings. See Akiyama Affidavit, 1J 5.
The Screening Panel that heard the Bowen matters had four members,
including Christine Greenwood, a member of the law firm Magleby & Greenwood.
See Akiyama Affidavit, <|J 7. At the beginning of the Screening Panel hearings on
the Bowen matters, Greenwood identified herself and the firm to which she
belongs. See Akiyama Affidavit, U 8. Neither Bowen nor his counsel objected to
Greenwood sitting as a member of the Screening Panel. See Akiyama Affidavit,
H9-

1

Akiyama's affidavit was originally attached to the OPC's Memorandum in
Opposition to Petition for Review of Bar Disciplinary Proceedings.
^

After the hearings, the Screening Panel made findings and conclusions
concerning Bowen's professional misconduct.

See In re Bowen, Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand,
March 1, 2006, a copy of which is provided in the Addendum. Based upon these
findings and conclusions, the Screening Panel recommended that Mr. Bowen
receive discipline in the form of a public reprimand. See id.
Pursuant to Rule 14-510 of the RLDD, Bowen filed an exception to the
Screening Panel's recommendation of discipline. See In re Bowen, Ruling on
Exception to Recommendation for Public Reprimand, OPC No. 05-0391, 050433, 05-0628, 05-0448, June 30, 2006.2
The Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee heard Bowen's
exceptions on June 16, 2006. See id. at 2; 5. Neither Bowen nor his counsel
raised any issue concerning Greenwood's participation as a Screening Panel
member. See Akiyama Affidavit, Tf 15. The Chair denied Bowen's exceptions,
adopted the Screening Panel's recommendation of discipline, and issued the
order of public reprimand against Bowen. See In re Bowen, Order of Discipline:
Public Reprimand, Case No[s]. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0628, 05-0448, June 30,

2

Although these proceedings may not be confidential within the meaning of Rule
14-515, RLDD, a copy of this document has not been attached but will be
provided if the Court requests it.
4

2006, a copy of which is provided in the Addendum.
Consistent with the OPC's usual practices and procedures, the OPC
prepared and submitted to the Utah Bar Journal a summary of discipline
concerning Bowen's public reprimand. Akiyama Affidavit, U 15. Bowen filed a
Petition for Judicial Review of Administrative Order in the District Court on July
25, 2006. See Petition for Judicial Review of Administrative Order, Bowen v.
Utah State Bar, Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 060912210, a copy of
which is provided in the Addendum. Bowen's District Court petition attached a
copy of the Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand, as well as the Screening
Panel's Findings and Conclusions. See id.
On August 4, 2006, ten days after Bowen filed his Petition for Judicial
Review of Administrative Order, he filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction See
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Bowen v. Utah State Bar, Third Judicial District
Court, Case No. 060912210, a copy of which is provided in the Addendum. He
did not file a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. See Docket, Bowen v.
Utah State Bar, Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 060912210, a certified
copy of which is provided in the Addendum.

Neither the Petition for Judicial

Review of Administrative Order, nor the Motion for Preliminary Injunction or the
memorandum filed in support thereof, raised any issue concerning the propriety
of Greenwood participating in the Screening Panel hearing. See Memorandum

in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Third Judicial District
Court, Case No. 060912210, a copy of which is provided in the Addendum.
The OPC responded with a Motion to Dismiss and a Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, each of which ultimately was
successful. See Memorandum Decision and Order, Bowen v. Utah State Bar,
Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 060912210, a copy of which is provided in
the Addendum.
A few days before the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and
Order,

Bowen

submitted

a document

captioned

"Petitioner's

Notice of

Withdrawal." See Petitioner's Notice of Withdrawal, Bowen v. Utah State Bar,
Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 060912210, a copy of which is provided in
the Addendum.

In the Notice of Withdrawal, dated October 13, 2006, Bowen

raised for the first time questions concerning Greenwood's participation on the
Screening Panel, which he erroneously identified as having three members. See
id. at 1-2.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Travis Bowen was disciplined consistent with the procedures set forth in
the RLDD, including the appeal provided under that body of rules.

Bowen

nevertheless asks the Court to review an Order of Discipline issued by the Ethics
and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, and requests that the
recommendation and order be vacated and a trial de novo held in District Court,

with a retraction of the discipline published in the Utah Bar Journal. The Court
should deny Bowen's request, for he has had all of the due process provided
under the RLDD, and the public reprimand entered against him should stand.
ARGUMENT
I.

Through This Court's Rulemaking Process, the Ethics and Discipline
Committee's Powers to Impose Discipline Were Expanded to Include
Public Reprimands as a Means of Preserving Court and OPC
Resources; the Relief Mr. Bowen Requests Would Undermine This
Procedural Structure, Create Substantial Work, and Deprive the
District Court and the OPC of the Benefits Promoted By the Rule
Changes
The RLDD were adopted in 1993, significantly changing the existing

system of discipline to employ the District Court as the fact finder for formal
complaints.

See Summary, RLDD. The Advisory Committee on the Rules of

Professional Conduct concluded that this model was preferable "in terms of
economy, efficiency, public access, fairness and familiarity. Discipline ordered
by a district court would be appealable to the Supreme Court without prior review
by the Bar Commission." See id.
The new rules maintained the use of the Ethics and Discipline Committee
for imposing private discipline, but provided for review of private discipline by the
Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee, rather than the Board of Bar

7

Commissioners. See Summary, RLDD; see also In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 211
(Utah 1997).3
In 2003, the Court expanded the powers of the Ethics and Discipline
Committee to

permit

Screening

Panels to recommend

imposing

public

reprimands, which in turn are entered by the Committee's Chair. See Rule 14510(b)(5)(E), RLDD; see also Amendment Notes, Rule 14-510, RLDD. The rule
permitting a respondent to submit an exception to the Screening Panel's
recommendation of private admonition, and to have a hearing if requested, was
amended to include public reprimands. See Rule 14-510(c), RLDD.
It should be noted that this Court seems to have the view that a closer
level of scrutiny by the Court is warranted in cases where an attorney's license
might be subject to restrictive discipline such as a suspension or disbarment.
See In re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881, 886-887 (Utah 2001), where the Court states:
"Because the private practice of law cannot easily be stopped and started again,
unless there is a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public, a disbarred
lawyer should be entitled to a stay of judgment pending appeal to this court
where the final authority for discipline rests." The OPC submits that because

3

Bowen erroneously states that the Babilis case "concerned the rights of parties
to appeal the recommendation of 'the Board,' which performed essentially the
same function the screening panel now performs." Appellant Brief at 2. Instead,
one of the issues decided by the Babilis decision was the right of the OPC to
appeal a District Court decision. See Babilis, 951 P.2d at 213-214.
8

neither admonitions nor public reprimands restrict an attorney's license to
practice, the Court by its rule change acknowledged that the due process
provided by Rule 14-510 of the RLDD was sufficient for the imposition of the
lesser non-restrictive sanctions without the need for further scrutiny of the Court.4
This view is further supported by Rule 14-517(a) of the RLDD which provides:
(a) Governing rules. Except as otherwise provided in this article, the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure governing civil appeals, and the Utah Rules of Evidence
apply in formal discipline actions and disability actions.
In this respect, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to formal discipline
actions and disability actions, not the disciplinary sanctions of admonition and
public reprimand issued by this Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee pursuant
to Rule 14-510(b) of the RLDD, since Rule 14-510(c) of the RLDD specifically
outlines the appellate procedure for the issuance of admonitions and public
reprimands by this Committee.
Additionally,

this

expansion

of

the

Screening

Panel's

authority

acknowledged the fact that "[u]nder the current sanctions standards the factual
basis for a private admonition and a public reprimand is essentially the same with

4

Bowen asserts that a public reprimand is a "loss of liberty." Appellant Brief at 7.
This implies that a public reprimand is similar to a suspension or disbarment with
respect to procedural safeguards. This assertion is without support under the
Utah Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. "Reprimand is public discipline
which declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's
right to practice." Rule 14-603(e), Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

the difference being the level of harm to the client, the legal profession, or the
administration of justice." Petition to Amend the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability, In re Utah State Bar, Feb. 25, 2002, at 19, a copy of which is provided
in the Addendum. As outlined further by that Petition:
The change will allow the expedited resolution of similar cases
because it will eliminate the need to file formal complaints in the
district court on those cases that are only slightly above the
standards for an admonition. . . . As a practical matter, screening
panels rarely, if at all, vote a matter "formal" (i.e., find probable
cause to send a case to the district court) unless they believe the
violation warrants suspension or disbarment. This is because the
time and expense required at the district court level is considerable,
and it is often difficult to justify the imposition of a "mere" public
reprimand.
Id.
This Court unquestionably has the ability and authority to act in matters of
lawyer discipline at any time, and extraordinary situations might occasionally
arise that warrant the Court ordering a departure from the rules it promulgated for
conducting attorney discipline cases.5

Such a departure is not warranted,

however, where the matter has proceeded through the channels already
provided by the Court, even assuming for the sake of argument, that an error
was committed.

If that were the case, the Court may as well adopt a rule

providing for its review of any case resulting in discipline to which the respondent

5

See In re Harding, 2004 UT 100 (involving the attorney discipline of a former
judge).
10

objects, even if the respondent has already exhausted the review provided for by
the RLDD, with the possibility of remand for a trial de novo in the District Court.
The OPC does not think the Court wants to be in that position, and indeed, doing
as Bowen asks would be a return to the procedures provided before the 2003
amendments, albeit with an additional layer of review afforded through the
exceptions process.6
II.

Bowen's Petition Should Be Denied Because He Received Discipline
Consistent With the Procedures Provided By This Court in the Rules
of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, Including a Screening Panel
Hearing and an Exceptions Hearing, and Thereby Exhausted His
Remedies
Bowen claims he was denied due process because Greenwood was one

of four members of the Screening Panel that heard his case.

This claim is

without merit.
The RLDD are designed to promote "the just and speedy resolution of
every complaint."

The procedures provide for a Screening Panel hearing

conducted by at least two members of the Bar plus one public member, and
u

[t]he concurrence of a majority of those members present and voting at any

proceeding shall be required for a screening panel determination."

Rule 14-

503(d), RLDD. The respondent has the opportunity to appear and testify, along

6

In the OPC's view, this consideration is paramount, and so compelling that the
Court need not even consider Mr. Bowen's underlying substantive complaints.
Nevertheless, these are addressed below.
11

with witnesses, and to present oral argument; a written brief may also be
submitted for consideration. See Rule 14-510(b)(2), RLDD. After reviewing the
facts, the Screening Panel acting in behalf of the Ethics and Discipline
Committee makes a determination from among those identified in Rule 14-510.
If the Screening Panel recommends an admonition or a public reprimand, the
respondent has the option of submitting an exception, in which case, the Chair
makes a determination. See Rule 14-510(c), RLDD. A hearing is provided if the
respondent requests one. See id.
These procedures were followed in Bowen's cases. Bowen participated at
the Screening Panel hearings: he testified, he presented evidence, and his
counsel presented argument.

What he did not do, is raise any objection to

Greenwood's participation as one of four Screening Panel members, despite his
certain knowledge that the law firm Magleby & Greenwood, and specifically Mr.
Magleby, represents the plaintiff in a civil action against him. Moreover, Bowen
filed an exception, requested a hearing, and was afforded such a hearing before
the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. During the exception hearing,
Bowen and his counsel presented argument, but failed to meet the burden of
proof

by

showing

that

the

Screening

Panel's

recommendation

was

"unreasonable, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, or
otherwise clearly erroneous." Rule 14-510(c), RLDD.
issue as to Greenwood.

12

They never raised any

III.

There Is No Evidence That Bias Was a Factor In Bowen's Case
Before the Ethics and Discipline Committee
As previously mentioned, not a word was said about Greenwood's

participation, and more importantly there is no evidence that Greenwood was
even aware of her firm's involvement in the lawsuit against Bowen, let alone its
particulars; or was in fact biased against him.

This lack of knowledge of

Greenwood of any possible conflict certainly counters Bowen's assertion that
Greenwood would have had the burden or affirmative duty to recuse herself in
his case. Appellant's Brief at 11-15. See also Code of Judicial Conduct Cannon
3(E), and specifically 3(E)(1)(c) which requires knowledge when disqualification
is based on financial interest.
Even if one assumes, for the sake of argument, that bias may have
flavored Greenwood's judgment in this case, there still is no evidence that her
voice, which was merely one of four, determined the Screening Panel's decision
to recommend a public reprimand—a recommendation independently sustained
by the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee after a hearing. The one
person in the room during each hearing who was certainly aware that the law firm
Magleby & Greenwood was involved in an action against Travis Bowen was
Bowen, and he remained silent—a sign of tacit consent.
Although the RLDD have no provision requiring recusal of Screening
Panel members, as a matter of practice, the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline

Committee has counseled Committee members who comprise the Screening
Panels to recuse themselves from hearing a particular case if, upon reflection,
they believe that they cannot make an unbiased recommendation concerning the
respondent. Any Screening Panel member proceeding with a case should be
presumed

unbiased, and Greenwood

should

have the

benefit of that

presumption.
Bowen argues that the statute requiring judges to disqualify themselves in
certain situations should apply here, but this argument is misplaced for several
reasons. Among other things, the statute provides that a judge may not sit in any
action or proceeding to which he is a party or in which he is interested. See Utah
Code § 78-7-1 (1)(a). Aside from the fact that Greenwood was not a "judge"
within the meaning of the statue, there is no evidence she was interested in this
proceeding, nor is there any evidence that Magleby's use of the Utah Bar Journal
summary of Bowen's public reprimand was the cause of any ruling or decision
adverse to Bowen.7
IV.

Even If Bowen Can now Establish Facts Which Might Raise a
Potential Conflict of an Ethics and Discipline Committee Member, By
Any Standard, Bowen Failed to Exercise Due Diligence and Did Not
Assert His Claim of Bias Within a Reasonable Time
Bowen is essentially requesting an unlimited time for appeal because of

7

In the OPC's view, an attorney's discipline history is directly relevant only to
subsequent disciplinary proceedings, and not directly relevant to civil actions to
which an attorney is a party. See e.g. Scope, R. Pro. Con.
14

his claim of a due process violation.

However, even in suspension and

disbarment cases where a direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court is set out in
the RLDD, an appeal must be filed within 30 days of the final order pursuant to
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 14-517(a), RLDD and Rule
4(a), URAP. Bowen had almost six months from the time of the Screening Panel
hearing to the exception hearing to raise his objection regarding Greenwood's
participation at the Screening Panel hearing but he failed to do so. Bowen failed
to raise any objections to Greenwood's participation until almost ten months after
the Screening Panel hearing.
Other civil cases also require issues regarding the disqualification of a
judge to be raised within a reasonable time prior to the appellate level. Rule
63(b)(1)(B)(iii) requires that motions to disqualify a judge be filed not later than 20
days after "the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion
is based."

Rule 63, URCP.

Bowen should have learned of Greenwood's

potential conflict by the exception hearing. Greenwood identified herself and the
firm to which she belongs, which included Magleby's name, at the Screening
Panel hearing. Bowen was also aware of the malpractice case against him and
the identity of Magleby as opposing counsel. As far as the OPC knows, Bowen
made no effort to review the Screening Panel hearing record, i.e. requests for a
copy of the Screening Panel hearing tape or other hearing records prior to the

exception hearing.

Even when Bowen finally raised his objections for the first

time in his Notice of Withdrawal dated October 13, 2006, he raised his concerns
more than twenty days after he claims Magleby raised the Bar Journal in his oral
arguments in the malpractice case on September 19, 2006. See Petitioner's
Notice of Withdrawal a copy of which is provided in the Addendum, and
Appellant's Brief at 9. The exception process afforded Bowen more than enough
time to make reasonably diligent efforts to learn of his objections to Greenwood's
participation but he failed to timely raise the issue.
Additionally, it should be noted that motions for relief from an order or
judgment are required to be filed within a reasonable time with a three-month
limit for mistakes, newly discovered evidence or fraud. See Rule 60(b), URCP.
Bowen still failed to timely raise his objection under the timeframe set out under
Rule 60(b), URCP. With due diligence, Bowen should have been able to discover
evidence regarding his objections to Greenwood's participation within three
months from the date of the Screening Panel hearing. Thus, Bowen has not
demonstrated that he made any active attempt within a reasonable amount of

Furthermore, given the fact that during the six months between the Screening
Panel hearing (where Greenwood very clearly identified Magleby as part of her
firm), and the exception hearing both the Screening Panel hearing and the
malpractice case (where Magleby was opposing counsel) were ongoing issues
for Bowen, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Bowen should have inquired
whether both "Maglebys" were the same attorney. This is especially reasonable
since the name "Magleby" is not a common name.
16

time to discover evidence that Greenwood knew of the involvement of her firm
with his case.
V.

The Relief Bowen Requests Is Not Provided for By the RLDD, and He
Has Already Made Public the Reprimand Imposed By the Ethics and
Discipline Committee
In matters that do not involve interim suspension proceedings,9 reciprocal

discipline,10 or proceedings in which a lawyer is declared to be incompetent or
alleged to be incapacitated,11 the RLDD limit the District Court's jurisdiction to
disciplinary matters in which a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline
Committee "finds probable cause to believe that there are grounds for public
discipline and that a formal complaint is merited."12 Rule 14-511(a), RLDD. The
RLDD do not provide for the District Court to conduct de novo hearings on
informal complaints when a Screening Panel has recommended an admonition
or a public reprimand. Accordingly, the relief Mr. Bowen requests is outside the
rules.
Bowen asked the District Court for injunctive relief in the form of an order
barring the Utah State Bar from publishing the fact that he was publicly
reprimanded. However, Bowen did not perfect his request for injunctive relief by

9

See Rules 14-518 and 14-519, RLDD.
See Rule 14-522, RLDD.
11
See Rule 14-523, RLDD.
12
As the Harding decision made clear, however, the Supreme Court may direct
the OPC to refer the matter directly to it, thereby by-passing the District Court.
See In re Harding, 2004 UT 100, fi 19.
10
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submitting an affidavit or verified complaint for a temporary restraining order
pending adjudication of the District Court case.

See Rule 65A(b), URCP.

Furthermore, his petition in the District Court rendered moot the relief he
requested, inasmuch as it attached the disciplinary order as "Appendix A." The
reprimand is now a public document, available to anyone interested in the case.
VI.

The OPC Had a Duty to Disseminate the Disciplinary Results in
Bowen's Case and Did So Consistent With Its Usual Practices and
Procedures
The OPC has a duty delegated to it by this Court to "disseminate public

disciplinary results to the Bar and the public through the Utah Bar Journal . . . ."
Rule 14-504(b)(13), RLDD; see also Pendleton v. Utah State Bar, 16 P.3d 1230,
1232 (Utah 2000) (the OPC's official duties include publishing disciplinary
summaries in the journal).
Bowen received a public reprimand pursuant to the RLDD and had
exhausted his exception remedy.

The OPC was not restricted based on the

mere request for injunctive relief and Bowen had already "published" the
disciplinary result with the District Court. Thus, the OPC proceeded as usual with
drafting a disciplinary summary and submitting it for publication to the Utah Bar
Journal.

Doing otherwise would have been an abrogation of its duties and a

departure from its practice in other cases.
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CONCLUSION
In exercising its exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law,
including matters of discipline for professional misconduct, the Utah Supreme
Court promulgated the RLDD. These rules afford Respondents the opportunity
to appear before a Screening Panel of the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and
Discipline Committee which has authority, among other things, to recommend
that a Respondent receive discipline in the form of a public reprimand.

If a

Respondent wishes to seek review of such a recommendation, it is through filing
an exception, which may be heard by the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline
Committee.
The RLDD provide no additional recourse, and although the Court could
exercise its original jurisdiction at any point, and presumably could order the
District Court to proceed de novo, there is no sound basis for departing from the
established rules promulgated by this Court. Bowen was aware that Greenwood
was a member of the law firm Magleby & Greenwood, but neither he nor his
counsel objected to her participation in the Screening Panel hearing, and they
raised no concerns along these lines at the exception hearing. Indeed, Bowen
did not even mention it until withdrawing his ill-conceived District Court petition.

19

The public reprimand was imposed consistent with the RLDD, and the Court
should decline Bowen's Petition.
DATED:

February ^

, 2007.
UTAH STATE BAR

Billy L. Walker
Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the r

day of February, 2007, I caused to be

mailed via United States mail, first class postage pre-paid, two true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE to Gregory G. Skordas and
Rebecca C. Hyde at the following address: SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE, LLC,
341 South Main Street, Suite 303, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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Rule 14-510. Prosecution and appeals.
(a) Informal complaint of unprofessional conduct.
(a)(1) Filing. A disciplinary proceeding may be initiated against any member of
the Bar by any person, OPC counsel or the Committee, by filing with the Bar, in writing,
an informal complaint in ordinary, plain and concise language setting forth the acts or
omissions claimed to constitute unprofessional conduct. Upon filing, an informal
complaint shall be processed in accordance with this article.
(a)(2) Form of informal complaint. The informal complaint need not be in any
particular form or style and may be by letter or other informal writing, although a form
may be provided by the OPC to standardize the informal complaint format. It is
unnecessary that the informal complaint recite disciplinary rules, ethical canons or a
prayer requesting specific disciplinary action. The informal complaint shall be signed by
the complainant and shall set forth the complainant's address, and may list the names
and addresses of other witnesses. The informal complaint shall be notarized and
contain a verification attesting to the accuracy of the information contained in the
complaint. In accordance with Rule 14-504(b), complaints filed by OPC are not required
to contain a verification. The substance of the informal complaint shall prevail over the
form.
(a)(3) Initial investigation. Upon the filing of an informal complaint, OPC counsel
shall conduct a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether the informal complaint is
sufficiently clear as to its allegations. If it is not, OPC counsel shall seek additional facts
from the complainant; additional facts shall also be submitted in writing and signed by
the complainant.
(a)(4) Notice of informal complaint. Upon completion of the preliminary
investigation, OPC counsel shall determine whether the informal complaint can be
resolved in the public interest, the respondent's interest and the complainant's interest.
OPC counsel and/or the screening panel may use their efforts to resolve the informal
complaint. If the informal complaint cannot be so resolved or if it sets forth facts which,
by their very nature, should be brought before the screening panel, or if good cause
otherwise exists to bring the matter before the screening panel, OPC counsel shall
cause to be served a NOIC by regular mail upon the respondent at the address
reflected in the records of the Bar. The NOIC shall have attached a true copy of the
signed informal complaint against the respondent and shall identify with particularity the
possible violation(s) of the Rules of Professional Conduct raised by the informal
complaint as preliminarily determined by OPC counsel.
(a)(5) Answer to informal complaint. Within 20 days after service of the NOIC on
the respondent, the respondent shall file with OPC counsel a written and signed answer
setting forth in full an explanation of the facts surrounding the informal complaint,
together with all defenses and responses to the claims of possible misconduct. For
good cause shown, OPC counsel may extend the time for the filing of an answer by the

respondent not to exceed an additional 30 days. Upon the answer having been filed or if
the respondent fails to respond, OPC counsel shall refer the case to a screening panel
for investigation, consideration and determination. OPC counsel shall forward a copy of
the answer to the complainant.
(a)(6) Dismissal of informal complaint. An informal complaint which, upon
consideration of all factors, is determined by OPC counsel to be frivolous, unintelligible,
barred by the statute of limitations, more adequately addressed in another forum,
unsupported by fact or which does not raise probable cause of any unprofessional
conduct, or which OPC declines to prosecute may be dismissed by OPC counsel
without hearing by a screening panel. OPC counsel shall notify the complainant of such
dismissal stating the reasons therefor. The complainant may appeal a dismissal by OPC
counsel to the Committee chair within 15 days after notification of the dismissal is
mailed. Upon appeal, the Committee chair shall conduct a de novo review of the file,
either affirm the dismissal or require OPC counsel to prepare a NOIC, and set the
matter for hearing by a screening panel. In the event of the chair's recusal, the chair
shall appoint the vice chair or one of the screening panel chairs to review and determine
the appeal.
(b) Proceedings before Committee and screening panels.
(b)(1) Review and investigation. A screening panel shall review all informal
complaints referred to it by OPC counsel, including all the facts developed by the
informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, and the recommendations of
OPC counsel.
(b)(2) Respondent's appearance. Before any action is taken which may result in
the recommendation of an admonition or the filing of a formal complaint, the screening
panel shall, upon at least 14 days notice, afford the respondent an opportunity to appear
before the screening panel and testify under oath, together with any witnesses called by
the respondent, and to present an oral argument with respect to the informal complaint.
All testimony shall be recorded and preserved so long as proceedings are pending, and
in any event, not less than six months following the hearing. A written brief may also be
submitted to the screening panel by the respondent. The brief shall not exceed five
pages in length unless permission for enlargement is extended by the chair or the
chair's delegate for good cause shown. A copy of the brief shall be forwarded by OPC
counsel to the complainant.
(b)(3) Complainant's appearance. A complainant shall have the right to appear
before the screening panel personally and testify under oath, together with any
witnesses called by the complainant, with respect to the informal complaint or in
opposition to the matters presented by the respondent. The complainant may be
represented by counsel or some other representative.

(b)(4) Right to hear evidence. The complainant and the respondent shall each
have the right to be present during the presentation of the evidence unless excluded by
the screening panel chair for good cause shown.
(b)(5) Screening panel determination. Upon review of all the facts developed by
the informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, the screening panel, in behalf
of the Committee, shall make one of the following determinations:
(b)(5)(A) that the informal complaint does not raise facts in which there is
probable cause to believe that the respondent was engaged in unprofessional
conduct, in which case, the informal complaint shall be dismissed. OPC counsel
shall promptly give notice of such dismissal by regular mail to the complainant
and the respondent; or
(b)(5)(B) that a letter of caution may be issued. The letter shall be signed
by OPC counsel or the screening panel chair and shall serve as a guide for the
future conduct of the respondent. Thereupon, the informal complaint shall be
dismissed, with the complainant and the respondent being notified of the
dismissal. The complainant shall also be confidentially notified of the caution; or
(b)(5)(C) that a dismissal may be conditioned upon the performance by
the respondent of specified conduct which the Committee determines to be
warranted by the facts and the Rules of Professional Conduct; or
(b)(5)(D) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair
with an accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent be
admonished. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and shall
state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and the
basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the respondent should be admonished. A copy of such screening
panel recommendation shall be served upon the respondent prior to delivery of
the recommendation to the Committee chair. The Committee chair shall enter an
order admonishing the respondent if no exception has been filed within ten days
of notice of the recommendation being provided to the respondent; or
(b)(5)(E) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair
with an accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent
receive a public reprimand. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in
writing and shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and
defenses and the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent should receive a public
reprimand. A copy of such screening panel recommendation shall be served
upon the respondent prior to the delivery of the recommendation to the
Committee chair. The Committee chair shall enter an order publicly reprimanding
the respondent if no exception has been filed within ten days of notice of the
recommendation being provided to the respondent; or

(b)(5)(F) that a formal complaint be filed against the respondent.
(b)(6) Determination of appropriate sanction. In determining an appropriate
sanction and only after having found unethical conduct, the screening panel may
consider any admonitions or greater discipline imposed upon the respondent within the
five years immediately preceding the alleged offense.
(b)(7) Continuance of disciplinary proceedings. A disciplinary proceeding may be
held in abeyance by the Committee prior to the filing of a formal complaint when the
allegations or the informal complaint contain matters of substantial similarity to the
material allegations of pending criminal or civil litigation in which the respondent is
involved.
(c) Exceptions to admonitions and public reprimands. Within ten days after notice of the
recommendation of an admonition or public reprimand to the Committee chair, the
respondent may file with the Committee chair an exception to the recommendation and
may also, if desired, request a hearing. If a request for a hearing is made, the
Committee chair, or a screening panel chair designated by the Committee chair, shall
proceed to hear the matter in an expeditious manner, with OPC counsel and the
respondent having the opportunity to be present. The complainant's testimony may be
read into the record. The complainant need not appear personally unless called by the
respondent as an adverse witness for purposes of cross-examination. The respondent
shall have the burden of proof of showing that the recommendation is unreasonable,
unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious and otherwise clearly
erroneous.

Kate A. Toomey, #6446
Deputy Counsel
Billy L. Walker, #3358
Senior Counsel
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)531-9110

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Travis Bowen,
Petitioner,
v.

]

The Utah State Bar,

I
;

AFFIDAVIT OF
DIANE AKIYAMA

Case No. 20060950-SC

Respondent.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Diane Akiyama, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

• I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify, and have

personal knowledge of the matters stated herein.
2.

I am an attorney employed by the Utah State Bar's Office of

Professional Conduct ("OPC"). My responsibilities include prosecuting before the
Screening Panels of the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee
informal complaints against attorneys.

3.

I was the attorney assigned primary responsibility for the informal

complaints against Travis Bowen that are in issue here.
4.

On January 19, 2006, Mr. Bowen appeared for hearings before a

Screening Panel of the Utah Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee
involving four informal complaints against him alleging professional misconduct.
5.

At the Screening Panel hearings on January 19, 2006. Mr. Bowen

was represented by counsel, Charles Gruber and Mary Ann Q. Wood.
6.

I was also present for the January 19 Screening Panel hearings

involving Mr. Bowen.
7.

The Screening Panel that heard the Bowen matters had four

members, including Christine Greenwood, who is a member of the law firm
Magleby & Greenwood.
8.

At the beginning of the Screening Panel hearings on the Bowen

matters, Ms. Greenwood identified herself and the firm to which she belongs.
9.

Neither Bowen nor his counsel objected to Ms. Greenwood sitting

as a member of the Screening Panel.
10.

After the hearings, the Screening Panel made findings and

conclusions concerning Bowen's professional misconduct and recommended
that Bowen receive discipline in the form of a public reprimand.
11.

Pursuant to Rule 10 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability

("RLDD"). Bowen filed an exception to the Screening Panel's recommendation of
discipline.

12.

The Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee heard the matter

on June 16,2006.
13.

Mr. Bowen was present for the exception hearing on June 16, as

was his counsel, Greg Skordas.
14.

I was also present for the exception hearing on June 16, 2006.

15.

Neither Mr. Bowen nor Mr. Skordas raised any issue during the

exception hearing concerning Greenwood's participation as a Screening Panel
member.
16.

Consistent with the OPC's usual practices and procedures, I

prepared and submitted to the Utah Bar Journal a summary of discipline
concerning Mr. Bowen's public reprimand.
.-•r-i'H

DATED this T

day of November, 2006.
/7/i...-,
Mi

(ib^^
Diane Akiyama
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BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:
Travis Bowen, #00397
Re spondent.

Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0443,
05-0628

The matter of the complaints by Keith Kelly, Richard Smurthwaite, Michael
Walch, and Trevin Workman against Travis Bowen came on for hearing before
Screening Panel UC-1" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme
Court on January 19, 2006. Mr. Kelly, Mr. Smurthwaite, Mr. Walch and Mr. Workman
appeared in person without counsel, Mr. Bowen appeared in person with Charles
Gruber and Mary Anne Wood as counsel; and Diane Akiyama, Assistant Counsel,
appeared on behalf of the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC").
The Screening Panel recommends that Mr Bowen be publicly reprimanded for violating
Rules 1 5(aJ (Fees;. 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule) 7.1 (a; (Communications
Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads), 7.5;d) (Firm
Names and Letterhead), 8 Kb) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8 4'aj
!/

Misconduci; of the Rules of Professional Conduct

The facts upon which the Screening Panel has concluded the record establishes
probable cause of misconduct and, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr.
Bowen should be publicly reprimanded are as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Mr. Bowen's fees charged to his client in trade for office furniture was an

excessive fee considering the time and labor and the skill required to provide the
service.
2.

Mr. Bowen traded estate planning with a legal fee of $57,450.00 foi the

office furniture.
3.

The fee charged by Mr. Bowen was in excess of the fees typically charged

for similar legal services in this community.
4.

Mr. Bowen instructed his staff to increase his standard legal fee for the

work to be performed in order to pay for the furniture sold to the firm by the client.
5.

Mr. Bowen would recommend that his clients purchase certain life

insurance products.
6.

Mr. Bowen represented clients without first disclosing to them his or his

firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained if the clients purchased certain life
insurance products.
7.

Mr Bowen's expectation of financial benefits from the commissions as a

result of life instance products was not disclosed during client meetings.

8.

Mr Bowen's letterhead showed office locations in Las Vegas, Nevada and

Walnut Creek, California when he did not have offices in those locations.
9.

The identification of the Walnut Creek and Las Vegas firm locations aie

misleading to the public about the scope of services available to clients of Mr Bowen's
firm.
10.

Mr. Bowen's placement of an office location in Idaho is misleading

because he does not have a law office in Idaho.
11.

Mr. Bowen used an "of counsel" relationship on his letterhead with

Jonathan Duke, when in fact, he did not have such a relationship.
12.

Mr. Duke did not grant his permission to Mr. Bowen nor to Mr. Bower,'s

firm to indicate an "of counsel" relationship, or any other relationship, on the letterhead.
13.

Mr. Bowen knowingly failed to provide certain documents requested by

the OPC in this disciplinary matter.
14.

Some of the specific documents that the Screening Panel ("Pane!")

•discovered existed, but were not provided to the OPC in this disciplinary matter, are the
Crown Counsel Agreemient, the Xelan Agreement, documents of purported agreements
with attorneys Duke and Oshins and email from Duke, and the invoice loi furniture
purchased by Mr Bowen's firm and paid with attorney services in part
15

Form client letters and/or disclosures regarding allegations of failure to

disclose benefits lo the firm, of thirc party ser/ices/producis (i e insurance purchased by
clients; wouid nave been extremely helpful to OPC and the Panel. Mr Bower die leave

with the Panel a stack of records that were represented to be these disclosures, but the
Panel could not consider the additional documents as a basis for its decision as the
hearing had concluded and the complainants were leaving.
16.

The disciplinary process was substantially impeded as a result of the

failure to provide documents to OPC.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Rule 1.5(a) (Fees))
1.

Rule 1.5(a) (Fees) states that "A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement

for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearly excessive when,
after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and
firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." This fee is in excess of the
fee typically charged for similar legal services in this community. Further, Laura Guthrie
testified that Mr. Bowen instructed her to increase Mr. Bowen's standard legal fees for
the work to be perfored in order to pay for the furniture sold to the firm by the client. By
charging to his client in trade for office furniture an excessive fee, considering the time
and labor and the skill required to provide the service, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 1.5(a)
(Fees).
(Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule))
2.

Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule) states that

A lawyer snail not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person or by the lawyers own interest, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes

the representation will not be adversely affected; (2) and each client consents after
consultation.
Mr. Bowen's expectation of financial benefit from the commissions as a result of sales of
life insurance products was not disclosed during client meeting according to the testimony
of Laura Guthrie. By representing clients, no matter the number of clients, without first
disclosing to them Mr. Bowen's or his firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained by
the firm if the clients purchased certain life insurance policies, Mr, Bowen violated Rule
1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule).
(Rule 7,1 (a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyers Services))
3.

Rule 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) states that

"A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement
considered as a whole not materially misleading." Mr. Bowen violated Rule 7.1 (a)
(Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) when his letterhead showed office
locations in Las Vegas, Nevada and Walnut Creek, California when he did not have
offices in those locations.
(Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads))
4.

Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads) states that "A lawyer shall not

use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.. . ."
Mr. Bowen testified regarding some affiliations perhaps in Las Vegas, Nevada and

Walnut Creek, California however his testimony was not clear nor specific about the
alleged affiliations within those states. Mr. Bowen failed to produce any other evidence
in the form of witnesses or documents to show that his use of these office locations on
his letterhead was a proper representation of his firm's structure and services. The
OPC met its burden to prove that the identification of Walnut Creek and Las Vegas firm
locations were misleading to the public about the scope of services available to clients
of Mr. Bowen's firm. Additionally, Mr. Bowen's placement of an office location in Idaho
is misleading because he does not have a law office in Idaho. The panel finds that
considering the identification of the three out of state alleged law firm offices on Mr.
Bowen's letterhead, taken as a whole, is materially misleading the public, potential
clients and clients about the scope of services available, and the base of knowledge of
the firm's lawyers.

By listing office locations in Las Vegas, Nevada, Walnut Creek,

California and Idaho on his letterhead when he did not have law offices in those
locations, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads).
(Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads))
5.

Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads) states that "Lawyers may state

or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the
fact." Mr. Duke testified that he and Mr. Bowen had contemplated an "of counsel"
relationship,, drafted a proposed agreement concerning a potential affiliation and
discussed the matter on and off, but nothing was concluded nor finalized between
them. Mr. Bowen did not produce any evidence to the contrary; except to state that Mr.

Duke was "confused." The Panel finds that the OPC met its burden of proof to support
a violation by Mr. Bowen of this rule. By the use of an "of counsel" relationship on his
letterhead with an attorney when, in fact, he did not have such a relationship, Mr.
Bowen violated Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads).
(Rule 8.1(b) (Bar A d m i s s i o n and Disciplinary Matters))
6.

Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) states that " . . . a

l a w y e r . . . in connection with a. disciplinary matter shall not . . . knowingly fail to respond
to a. lawful demand for information from . . . disciplinary authority, except that this Rule
does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by PsUle 1.6."
7.

The representation made at the Screening Panel Hearing consisted

mainly of a concern producing records in violation of Ruie 1.6, confidentiality of client
matters and pending litigation between the Complainant and respondent. The Panel
considered the arguments regarding Rule 1.6 and pending litigation.

However, with

respect to those records that were clearly not related to client confidentiality (Rule 1.6),
or the pending iitigation (which the.Panel questions to be a valid excuse), Mr. Bowen
failed to provide them to OPC when requested to do so.

Some of the specific

documents that the Panel discovered existed, but were not provided to OPC would
nave been helpful to OPC and to the Panel if provided before the Hearing, or, for some,
if provided at all. Additionally, form client letters and/or disclosures regarding allegations
of failure to disciose benefits to the firm of third party services/products (i.e. insurance
purchased by clients) would have been extremely helpful to OPC and the Panel.

Although Mr. Bowen did leave with the Pane! a stack of records that were represented
to be these disclosures the Panel could not consider the additional documents as a
basis for its decision. When the documents were provided, the hearing had concluded
and the complainants were leaving.
8.

The Panel was concerned that documents, such as forms of client

disclosures were not provided to OPC. The Panel felt that a strategy of "stonewalling"
was used so not to provide requested information to the OPC in defense of the
allegations against Mr. Bowen.

However, the Panel recognized the arguments that

appeared to have been brought in good faith by counsel for not producing some
documents.

The documents not related to client confidences should have been

produced as requested. The Panel finds that this disciplinary process was substantially
impeded as a result of the failure to provide documents to OPC. By failing to provide
certain documents requested by the OPC in this disciplinary matter, Mr. Bowen violated
Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters).
(Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct))
9.

Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) states that "It is professional misconduct for a

lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly
assist or induce another to do so; or do so through the acts of another." By violating the
aforementioned
(Misconduct).

Rules of Professional Conduct, Mr. Bowen violated Rule

8.4(a)

RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE
Based upon the foregoing, the Screening Panel recommends that Travis Bowen
be publicly reprimanded for violation 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General
Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names
and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and
Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct), Rules of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
It is the intent of the Panel for the four cases against the respondent to be
consolidated into one case only.

The facts and circumstances arise out of common

and connected events with the same complainants".
find only one instance of a violation for each rule.

o

Therefore, the Panel intends to

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this (i4-h

day of

Jul^

_p 200G, I sent via

United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to:
Travis Bo wen
c/o Gregory Skordas
Skordas Caston & Morgan, L.L.C.
Boston Bldg. Ste. 1104
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
Richard Smurthwaite
503 West 2600 South
Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Trevin G. Workman
503 West 2600 South
Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Keith A Kelly
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Michael C. Walch
Gateway Tower, Suite 900
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

:

Bowen, Travis #00397

ORDER OF DISCIPLINE;
PUBLIC REPRIMAND

Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0628,
05-0448

Respondent.
These matters came on for hearing on January 19, 2006 before Screening Panel
"C-1" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. The Chair of
the Ethics and Discipline Committee, having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and the Recommendation of Discipline of the Screening Panel, and being fully
advised in the premises, hereby orders that Travis Bowen be and is hereby, PUBLICLY
REPRIMANDED for violating Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of interest: General
Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names
and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and
Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
DATED this the 3 < f f i j a y of PfU^^

Lawrence E. Sievens: Chair
Ethics and Discipline Committee

2006.
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Travis Bowen
c/o Gregory Skordas
Skordas Caston & Morgan, L.L.C.
Boston Bldg. Ste. 1104
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
Richard Smurthwaite
503 West 2600 South
Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Trevin G. Workman
503 West 2600 South
Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Keith A Kelly
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Michael C. Walch
Gateway Tower, Suite 900
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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Gregory G. Skordas (#3865)
SKORDAS GASTON & HYDE
Attorney for Defendant
9 Exchange Place, .Suite 1 104
Salt Laketily, UT 841 ] 1
Tel. 801.531.7444
Fax. 801.531.8885

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Travis Bowen,
Petitioner,
v.
The Utah State Bar
Respondent.

|
|
|
|
i
|
j
I

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
Case No. O l / \ r j
\'L'L\Q
,
Judge
L^VltVrVl
0

Travis Bowen. by and through his attorney Gregory G. Skordas. hereby Petitions
the Court for a Judicial Review from an Administrative Order, issued by the Utah State
Bar. Office of Professional Conduct, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15.
INTRODUCTION
On July 7. 2006, Counsel for Mr. Bowen received the Final Order of the
Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee, with the recommendation that
Mr. Bowen receive a Public Reprimand (a copy of the Order and Recommendation is

attached hereioj. Having exhausted the appeals process of the Utah State Bar; Petitioner
submits this Petition for Judicial Review. Petitioner Bowen seeks the intervention of the
CoLiil to grant h trial de novo pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-4Gb-l 5.
PARTIES, JURISDICTION & VENUE
1.

Petitioner, Travis Bowen is an individual who conducts business at 175 S.

West Temple, Suite 710, Salt Lake City, UT, 8411 ].
2.

The Utah State Ear is an administrative agency located at 465 E. 200 S.:.

Salt Lake City, UT, 84111.
3.

The Court has jurisdiction to review' by trial de novo all final agency

actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-15.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
4.

Travis Bowen is a licensed attorney in the State of Utah, who practices

law within the State of Utah.
5.

The Utah State Bar is an administrative agency that regulates the practice

of law in Utah and performs tasks of disciplining attorneys.
6.

An informal complaint against Mr. Bowen was filed with the Office of

Professional Conduct ("OPC") of the Utah State Bar.
7.

The informal complaint was screened by a Screening Panel of the Ethics

and Discipline Committee.
:

Peiiiionej ha: exhausted ail administrative remedies available pursuant to "Utah Code Ann vG3-46i>]4.
anc an excepiioi. to the Commiuee Chair has been completed, satisfying Utah Code Ann §63-46b-13.

8.

The Screening Pane] of the Ethics and Discipline Committee voted to

issue Travis Bowen a Public Reprimand aftei an informal adjudicative proceeding
9.

Counsel for Travis Bowen requested an exception to the recommendation

and a hearing before the Committee Chair.
1 0.

The Committee Chair adopted the recommendation of the Screening Pane]

after a hearing.
1 ].

Petitioner contends that there was not a preponderance of the evidence to

establish that Mr. Bowen should be publicly reprimanded.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Petitioner respectfully requests that the Third District Court grant a trial de
novo and issue an order vacating the issuance of a Public Reprimand. In addition,
Petitioner requests an injunction to bar the Utah State Bar from publishing a Public
Reprimand until Petitioner has exhausted the Court's appeal process. Petitioner further
requests that a hearing on this matter be scheduled at the earliest possible date and that
notice of such hearinc be sent directly to the Petitioner as well as to Petitioner's counsel.

DATED this 20th day of Jul v. 2006.

' (Jr^^rjf^D. Skordas
Aitoiii^'for Petitioner
\
\

Appendix A

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

in the Matter of the
Discipline of:

ORDER OF DISCIPLINE:
PUBLIC REPRIMAND

Bowen, Travis #00397

Case No. 05-0391; 05-0433, 05-0628,
05-0448

Respondent.
These matters came on for hearing on January 19, 2006 before Screening Panel
M

C-1" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. The Chair of

the Ethics and Discipline Committee, having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and the Recommendation of Discipline of the Screening Pane!, and being fully
advised in the premises, hereby orders that Travis Bowen be and is hereby, PUBLICLY
REPRIMANDED for violating Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of interest: Genera!
Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications. Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names
and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and
Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
DATED this the 3 < ^ d a y o f

fyu^~
{/

Lawrence E. Stevens, Chair
Ethics and Discipline Commits

,2006.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the (J-4V\ day of

•JIUIM

2006 I sent via United States

first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to:
Travis Bowen
c/o Gregory Skordas
Skordas Caston & Morgan, L.L.C.
Boston Bldg. Ste. 1104
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
Richard Smurthwaite
503 West 2600 South
Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Trevin G. Workman
503 West 2600 South
Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Keith A Kelly
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Michael C. Walch
Gateway Tower, Suite 900
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 64133

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND

Travis Bowen, #00397
Re spondejnt.

Case Ho. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0448,
05-0628

The matter of the complaints by Keith Kelly, Richard Smurthwaite. Michael
Waich, and Trevin Workman against Travis Bowen came on for hearing before
Screening Panel "C-T of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme
Court on January 19, 2006. Mr. Kelly, Mr. Smurthwaite, Mr. Walch and Mr. Workman
appeared in person without counsel, Mr. Bowen appeared in person with Charles
Gruber and Mary Anne 'Wood as counsel; and Diane Akiyama, Assistant Counsel,
appeared on behalf of the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC").
The Screening Panel recommends that Mr Bowen be publicly reprimanded for violating
Rules 1.5(a) (Fees;, 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications
Concerning a Lawyers Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm
Names and Letterhead). 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8 4(a)
(Misconauci) of the Rules of Professional Conduct

The facts upon which the Screening Panel has concluded the record establishes
probable cause of misconduct and, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr.
Bowen should be publicly reprimanded are as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Mr. Bowen's fees charged to his client in trade for office furniture was an

excessive fee considering the time and labor and the skill required to provide the
service.
2.

Mr. Bowen traded estate planning with a legal fee of $57,450.00 for the

office furniture.
3.

The fee charged by Mr. Bowen was in excess of the fees typically charged

for similar legal services in this community.
4.

Mr. Bowen instructed his staff to increase his standard legal fee for the

work to be performed in order to pay for the furniture sold to the firm by the client.
5.

Mr. Bowen would recommend that his clients purchase certain life

insurance products.
6.

Mr. Bowen represented clients without first disclosing to them his or his

firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained if the clients purchased certain life
insurance products.
7.

Mr. Bowen's expectation of financial benefits from the commissions as a

result of life insurance products was not disch^ri during client meetings.

8.

Mr. Bowen's letterhead showed office locations in Las Vegas, Nevada and

Walnut Creek, California when he did not have offices in those locations.
9.

The identification of the Walnut Creek and Las Vegas firm locations are

misleading to the public about the scope of services available to clients of Mr. Bowen's
firm.
10.

Mr. Bowen's placement of an office location in Idaho is misleading

because he does not have a law office in Idaho.
11.

Mr. Bowen used an "of counsel" relationship on his letterhead with

Jonathan Duke, when in fact, he did not have such a relationship.
12.

Mr. Duke did not grant his permission to Mr. Bowen nor to Mr. Bowen's

firm to indicate an "of counsel" relationship, or any other relationship, on the letterhead.
13.

Mr. Bowen knowingly failed to provide certain documents requested by

the OPC in this disciplinary matter.
14.

Some of the specific documents that the Screening Panel ("Panel")

discovered existed, but were not provided to the OPC in this disciplinary matter, are the
Crown Counsel Agreement, the Xelan Agreement, documents of purported agreements
with attorneys Duke and Oshins and email from Duke, and the invoice for furniture
purchased by Mr. Bowen's firm and paid with attorney services in part.
15.

Form client letters and/or disclosures regarding allegations of failure to

disclose benefits to the firm of third party services/products (i.e. insurance purchased by
clients) would have been extremely helpful to OPC and the Pane!. Mr. Bowen did leave

with the Pane! a stack of records that were represented to be these disclosures, but the
Panel could not consider the additional documents as a basis for its decision as the
hearing had concluded and the complainants were leaving.
16.

The disciplinary process was substantially impeded as a result of the

failure to provide documents to OPC.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Rule 1.5(a) (Fees))
1.

Rule 1.5(a) (Fees) states that "A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement

for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearly excessive when,
after a review-of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and
firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." This fee is in excess of the
fee typically charged for similar legal services in this community. Further, Laura Guthrie
testified that Mr, Bowen instructed her to increase Mr. Bowen's standard legal fees for
the work to be perfored in order to pay for the furniture sold to the firm by the client. By
charging to his client in trade for office furniture an excessive fee, considering the time
and labor and the skill required to provide the service, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 1.5(a)
(Fees).
(Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule))
2.

Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule) states that

A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person or by the lawyers own interest unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes

the representation will not be adversely affected; (2) and each client consents after
consultation.
Mr. Bowen's expectation of financial benefit from the commissions as a result of sales of
life insurance products was not disclosed during client meeting according to the testimony
of Laura Guthrie. By representing clients, no matter the number of clients, without first
disclosing to them Mr. Bowen's or his firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained by
the firm if the clients purchased certain life insurance policies, Mr. Bowen violated Rule
1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule).
(Rule 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services))
3.

Rule 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) states that

"A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement
considered as a whole not materially misleading." Mr. Bowen violated Rule 7.1(a)
(Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) when his letterhead showed office
locations in Las Vegas, Nevada and Walnut Creek, California when he did not have
offices in those locations.
(Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads))
4.

Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads) states that "A lawyer shall not

use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.. . ."
Mr. Bowen testified regarding some affiliations perhaps in Las Vegas, Nevada and

Walnut Creek California however his testimony was not cleai nor specific about the
alleged affiliations within those states Mr Bowen failed to produce any other evidence
in the foim of witnesses 01 documents to show/ that his use of these office locations on
his letterhead was a proper representation of his firms structure and services

The

OPC met its burden to prove that the identification of Walnut Creek and Las vegas firm
locations weie misleading to the public about the scope of services available to clients
of Mr Bowen s firm Additionally, Mr Bowen s placement of an office location in Idaho
is misleading because he does not have a law office in Idaho

The panel finds that

considering the identification of the three out of state alleged law firm offices on Mr
Bowen's letterhead, taken as a whole, is materially misleading tne public, potential
clients and clients about the scope of services available, and the base of knowledge of
the firm's lawyers

By listing office locations in Las Vegas, Nevada, Walnut Creek,

California and Idaho on his letterhead when he did not have law offices in those
locations, Mr Bowen violated Rule 7 5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads)
(Rule 7 5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads))
5

Rule 7 5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads; states that "Lawyers may stale

or imply tnat they practice in a partnersnip or otner organization only when that >s the
fact' Mr Dul-e testified that ne and l/l r Bowen nad contemplated an of counsJ'
relationship

crafied a propcsed agreement concerning a potent al animation and

d'scjcsed ihe majer on and orf DJ! notning was conduced nor finalized between
tnen

IV Er> e" sic not produce am essence ic tne contrary e/cep1 tc s*a e tha' \(\r

Duke was "confused." The Panel finds that the OPC met its burden of proof to support
a violation by Mr. Bowen of this rule. By the use of an "of counsel" relationship on his
letterhead with an attorney when, in fact, he did not have such a relationship, Mr.
Bowen violated Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads).
(Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters))
6.

Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) states that " . . .a

lawyer... in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not. . . knowingly fail to respond
to a lawful demand for information from . . . disciplinary authority, except that this Rule
does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6."
7.

The representation made at the Screening Panel Hearing consisted

mainly of a concern producing records in violation of Rule 1.6, confidentiality of client
matters and pending litigation between the Complainant and respondent. The Panel
considered the arguments regarding Rule 1.6 and pending litigation.

However, with

respect to those records that were clearly not related to client confidentiality (Rule 1.6),
or the pending litigation (which the Panel questions to be a valid excuse), Mr. Bowen
failed to provide them to OPC when requested to do so.

Some of the specific

documents that the Panel discovered existed, but were not provided to OPC would
have been helpful to OPC and to the Panel if provided before the Hearing, or, for some,
if provided at all. Additionally, form client letters and/or disclosures regarding allegations
of failure to disclose benefits to the firm of third party services/products (i.e. insurance
purchased by clients) would have been extremely helpful to OPC and the Pane!.

Although Mr. Bowen did leave with the Panel a stack of records that were represented
to be these disclosures the Panel could not consider the additional documents as a
basis for its decision. When the documents were provided, the hearing had concluded
and the complainants were leaving.
8.

The Panel was concerned that documents, such as forms of client

disclosures were not provided to OPC. The Panel felt that a strategy of "stonewalling"
was used so not to provide requested information to the OPC in defense of the
allegations against Mr. Bowen.

However, the Panel recognized the arguments that

appeared to have been brought in good faith by counsel for not producing some
documents.

The documents not related to client confidences should have been

produced as requested. The Panel finds that this disciplinary' process was substantially
impeded as a result of the failure to provide documents to OPC. By failing to provide
certain documents requested by the OPC in this disciplinary matter, Mr. Bowen violated
Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters).
(Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct))
9.

Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) states that "It is professional misconduct for a

lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." By violating the
aforementioned
(Misconduct).

Rules of Professional Conduct, Mr. Bowen violated Rule

8.4(a)

RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE
Based upon the foregoing, the Screening Panel recommends that Travis Bowen
be publicly reprimanded for violation 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General
Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a. Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names
and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and
Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct), Rules of the Rules of Professional
Conduct
It is the intent of the Panel for the four cases against the respondent to be
consolidated into one case only.

The facts and circumstances arise out of common

and connected events with the same complainants".
find only one instance of a violation for each rule.

G

Therefore, the Panel intends to

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify thai on this KM-h

day of

•JK.JH

, 2006, I sent via

United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to:
Travis Bowen
c/o Gregory Skordas
Skordas Caston & Morgan, L.L.C.
Boston Bldg. Ste. 1104
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
Richard Smurthwaite
503 West 2600 South
Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Trevin G. Workman
503 West 2600 South
Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Keith A Kelly
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Michael C. Walch
Gateway Tower, Suite 900
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

Gregory G Skordas (#3865)
SKORDAS CASTON & HYDE
Attorney for Petitionei
9 Exchange Place. Suite ] 104
Salt Lake City, UT 84] 11
Tel. 801.531.7444
Fax 801.531 8885

D^ THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Travis Bowen.
Petitioner.

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

v.
Case No. 060912210
The Utah State Bar
Respondent.

Judge Lindberg

Petitioner. Travis Bov/en. by and through counsel, hereby submits this Motion foi a
Preliminan' Injunction against the Office of Professional Conduct for printing a public reprimand
against Petitionei. for the reasons and arguments articulated in the supporting memorandum filed
contemporaneous!} herewith
i

DATED this

4~ da> of August. 2006
—

•

/)

SKORDAS CASTON & HYDE

Gieghr>yj Sl^ordas
Attonje^for Petitioner. Travis Bo wen

Certificate of Mailing
1. the undersigned, hereby by state under penalty of perjury that ] caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, pre-postage paid, first class mail to:

Diana Akiyama
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
Utah State Bar
645 S. 200 E., Suite 205
Salt Lake City, UT, 8411]
Dated this

MVV\, day of August 2006.

ClU#tW%f)

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TRAVIS BOWEN vs.

THE UTAH STATE BAR

CASE NUMBER 060912210 Administrative Ag

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
DENISE P LINDBERG

I certify that this is a true copy of the docket
text in this case on file in the ThirdJDistrict
Court Salt Lake County, State

PARTIES

this date.,

Petitioner - TRAVIS BOWEN
Represented by: GREGORY G SKORDAS
Respondent

THE UTAH STATE BAR
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Gregory G. Skordas (#3865)
SKORDAS CASTON & HYDE
Attorney for Petitioner
9 Exchange Place. Suite 11 04
Salt Lake City, UT 84]]]
Tel. 801.531.7444
Fax. 801.531.8885

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Travis Bowen,
Petitioner,

MEMORANDAUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

v.
Case No. 060912210
The Utah State Bar
Respondent.

Judge Lindberg

Petitioner. Travis Bowen. by and through his counsel of record, Gregory G. Skordas.
pursuant to Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby moves this Court for a
Preliminary Injunction against the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar
prohibiting the printing of a public reprimand against Petitioner.

INTRODUCTION
Attorney Travis Bowen ("Bowen") received notice from the Office of Professional
Conduct ("OPC") that four complaints had been filed against him by former employees of his
law firm. Mr. Bowen responded to the complaints, and a hearing was scheduled on January 19,
2006: before Screening Panel CI of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. After the hearing, the
committee recommended public reprimand as discipline for allegedly violating the Rules of
Professional Conduct. On March 13, 2006. Petitioner provided written notice of the exception to
the public reprimand to the OPC, pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability. The Committee Chair adopted the recommendation of the Screening Pane] and
ordered a public reprimand against Petitioner.
Travis Bowen filed a petition in Third District Court for a de novo review of the OPC
issuance of the public reprimand. To prevent the OPC from carrying out its disciplinary action
before Mr. Bowen has the opportunity to challenge the Screening Panel and the Committee
Chair's Findings of Fact, Mr. Bowen seeks a preliminary injunction.

ARGUMENT
A.

AN IMMEDIATE INJUNCTION AGAINST THE OPC IS NECESSARY TO
ALLOW FOR PROPER JUD1C1AL REVIEW OF THE AGENCY'S FINAL
DECISI ON A GAINST PETIT! ONER.

Mr. Bowen requests that the Court issue a preliminary injunction to bar the OPC from
printing a public reprimand in the quarterly bar journal, denying Mr. Bowen of the relief sought
in this matter. Following a hearing before a Screening Pane! and filing an exception to the

Committee Chair, the OPC issued an order stating the}' would be publishing a public reprimand
against Mr. Bowen However. Mr Bo wen has filed a Petition for Judicial P.eview in the above
captioned case in order to seek review oi the evidence supporting the OPC's decision (a petition
to review by trial de novo pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l 5j. Because proper relief in
Petitioner's claim against the Office of Professional Counsel ("OPC") cannot be given once the
OPC has published a public reprimand against Petitioner, this Court should issue a preliminary
injunction against the OPC from doing so.
Under Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a preliminary injunction may be
issued upon a showing of the following:
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction is issued;
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the
proposed order or injunction may cause the party enjoined;
(3) The injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest: and
(4) There is substantia] likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of
the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits which
should be the subject of further litigation.
See Ut R. Civ. Pro 65A(e; (2004).
Each of these factors aie discussed below, demonstrating to the Court the justification of
issuing a pieliminan injunction against the OPC.
(1) Mr, Bowen will suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction h ordered
Once the OPC publishes a public reprimand against Mr. Bowen. Petitioner will not be
able to repau the damage to his reputation and image as an attorney

'"Irreparable harm.5' a term

often interchanged with ''irreparable injur)1,5' is defined as "a harm that a court would be unable
to remedy even if the movant would prevail m the final adjudication." Johnson v Hermes
Association, Ltd. 2005 UT 82 ^ 2, ]28 P.3d 1151. Irreparable injury consists of ^wrongs of a
repeated and continuing character, or which occasion damages that are estimated only by
conjecture, and not by any accurate standard"'' Carrier v. Lindqiast, 2001 UT ]05, % 26; 37 P.3d
1112 ('interna] quotation marks omittedj. A party proves irreparable injur)- when establishing
that "he or she is unlikely to be made whole by an award of monetary damages or some other
legal, as opposed to equitable, remedy •• thus, an injur)7 is irreparable if the damages are
estimable only by conjecture and not by any accurate standard.3*' 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 33
(2004); see also Carrier, 2001 UT 105, <fl 26, 37 P.3d 1112.
In the present case. Mr. Bowen will suffer irreparable harm unless the Court issues a
preliminary injunction. The OPC has expressed to Mr. Bowen's counsel they intend to publish
the public reprimand even if a petition for judicial review is filed. If a public reprimand is
published. Mr. Bowen will lose credibility within his profession and suffer consequences in
terms of his reputation. The Utah State Bar publishes a journal that is sent to each member of the
bar ever)' three months. In the Discipline Comer, the bar publishes an account of attorneys who
have been found to have violated the ethical rules. Attorneys can be admonished (their names
are excluded from the publication) or publicly reprimanded (their names are listed). Indeed,
statements included in publications such as the Utah Bar Journal are, by their very nature,
irreversible.

Unless a preliminary injunction is granted by the Court, the OPC will publish an account
of the ethical rules Mr. Bowen is alleged to have violated, along with his full legal name. If
publication occurs and Mr. Bowen is successful in his petition, monetary damage would be based
on pure conjecture as to the amount of damage Mr. Bowen reputation and goodwill had suffered.
His injur)' would be irreparable: his injuries could not be compensated by monetary means. Il is
unlikely that Mr. Bowen could be made whole by an award of monetary damages

Therefore,

Mr. Bowen requests that the Court find that Mr. Bowen has proven this element of the standard,
and ultimately issue a preliminary injunction.
(2)

injury to Mr. Bowen clearlv outweighs any damage to the OPC

Mr. Boweir s irreparable harm clearly outweighs the minor inconvenience the OPC may
encounter. If this Court grants an injunction the OPC will only be inconvenienced in that they
will have to delay publication until Mr. Bowen has the opportunity to exhaust the court system.
Should Petitioner be successful in his review, then there will be no harm because the Court will
have determined that a reprimand was not warranted. Should Petitioner be unsuccessful, the
OPC can simp])' publish the public reprimand in the following issue of the Utah Bar Journal.
Thus, an}' argument thai the Office of Professional Counsel is damaged by an injunction is
meritless.
(3j

The injunction would not be adverse to the public interest

An injunction against publication would not be adverse to the public interest. Rather, the
injunction would serve the public interest by allowing for proper judicial review of a final
agenc} decision While public reprimands are published in the Utah Bar Journal to inform others

of what has occurred, the)' are not emergency notifications meant to deter the public from
involving themselves with the attorney. Thus, even if the Court ultimate]}' concludes that a
public remand is proper, the public will not be harmed if the information is withheld for a short
period of time.
(4)

There is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Bcrvven will prevail on the merits of
the underlying claim, and the case presents serious issues on the merits which
should be the subject of further litigation

Finally, there is a substantial likelihood that Petitioner will prevail on the merits of ihe
underlying claim, because the findings of facts are supported by disgruntled formei employees of
Mr. Bowen and hearsay statements. Under the applicable statute, Petitioner is entitled to a de
novo trial on the OPC's findings. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Thus, the Petitioner will be
given full opportunity to argue his claims. As outlined in the Petition's Petition for Judicial
Review, the OPC's findings are unsupported by the facts and cannot be justified under the
applicable law.
The bar complaints at issue in the below proceeding were filed by former employees oi
Mr Bowen. not clients of Mr. Bowen. The OPC's Findings of Fact to support the order for a
public reprimand is based upon the testimony of these former employees who misappropriated
intellectual properties belonging to Mr. Bowen's firm. At the time the bar complaints weie filed,
there was a pending lawsuit in the Third District Court between the parties MJ . Bowen alleges
in the complaint that the former employees breached their fiducian duty to Mr. Bowen's law
firm and misappropriated the law firm's intellectual property The OPC did not consider the

hostile relationship between the complamtants and Mr. Bowen when the Screening Panel made
their findings of fact!,
The OPC carries the burden of a preponderance of the evidence to establish that Mr.
Bowen violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The information used to support the
complaints filed with the bar are support by hearsay statements by these former employees.
The OPC's alleges.
1. Violation of 1.5(a) (Fees): The OPC found that Mr. Bowen charged excessive fees,
however, these issues were raised by formei employees, not clients. However. Mr Bowen
charged his fees in accordance to the local customs, and often exchanged goods in exchange of
legal sendees to accommodate clients' needs. However, the findings of fact do not oppose Mr.
Bowen's argument that the fees were reasonable in light of the nature of the work performed.
2. Violation of 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest) The OPC also alleges that Mr. Bowen
violated Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest by not disclosing the nature of his relationship with
Business Consulting. Mr. Bowen did make these disclosures. Furthermore, Mr. Bowen's
actions were m accordance with Ethics Opinion Nos. 04-05. 98-08 and 99-07. The lav, firm's
clients were informed of the relationship between Business Consultants and Mr. Bowen's lavs
firm and Mr Bowen has filed the Petition in the above refeienced case in order refute the
Screening Panel's findings of fact.
3 Violation of Rule 7.] (a; (Communication concerning a lawyer's service). It is alleged
thai Mr. Boven"i letterhead is '"misleading/* however, his letterhead listed even attorne) who
had a relationship with the law firm and indicated which states these attorne} *s held licenses

The law firm traveled to other states in order to give seminars in the areas of estate planning,
asset management, and tax issues. This did nol constitute the practice of law. and the letterhead
was only indicative of the law firm's activities in other states.
4. Violation of Rule 7.5(a) and (d) (Finn Names and Letterhead). Every attorney who
was listed on Mr. Bowen : s letterhead had a relationship with the law firm and was licensed 10
practice law in any state so indicated. Mr. Bowen knows of no requirement where an attorney
must have an office in every state in which he is licensed. In addition, contrary to the OPC's
findings. Mr. Duke had an appropriate relationship with the firm and therefore it was proper to
list Mr. Duke as "of counsel" on the firm's letterhead. Please note that Mr. Duke is also listed as
"of counsel" on the complaintants letterhead.
5. Violation of Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct). In light of the findings that Mr. Bowen
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct the OPC added this violation. Additionally, the OPC
requested certain documents held by Mr. Bowen. however, due to the attorney-client privilege,
Mr. Bowen was not capable of turning the documents over to the OPC. The OPC classified this
action as "impeding" the investigation.
It is clear that the OPC relied upon the testimony of disgruntled former attorneys who
were also being sued by Mr. Bowen to find ethical violations by Mr. Bowen. In a de novo
review of the evidence, once all hearsay evidence is cast aside:. no evidence will be left to
support the OPC's findings of fact.
Furthermore, the case presents serious issues on the merits which should be subject to
further litigation. Petitioner intends to appeal to the Utah Supreme Court if necessary, the issue

of whether informal administrative sanctions brought undei Plule lOfbjfSjfE) of the Rules of
Lawyer Discipline and Disability violate the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the case
carries with it a significant importance which should not be disturbed by allowing the OPC to
inflict irreparable harm on the Petitioner before the Court is able to hear the merits of case
Based on the aforementioned arguments. Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to
grant a preliminary injunction against the Office of Professional Conduct until the underlying
claim is resolved.

DATED this _ 4

day of August. 2006.

SKORDAS CASTON & HYDE

JL
Gregory t r Skordas
Attorney for Petitioner. Travis Bo wen

Certificate of Mailing
L the undersigned, hereby state under penalty of perjury that I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be mailed, pre-postage paid, first class mail to:

Diana Akiyama
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
Utah State Bar
645 S. 200 E., Suite 205
Salt Lake City? UT, 8411]
Dated this

(A%\ day of August, 2006.
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TRAVIS BOWEN,
Petitioner,

jJ

Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER
Case No. 060912210

v.
UTAH STATE EAR,
Respondent.

Judge Denise P. Lindberg
Date: October 17, 2006

^jl
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civi] Procedure 7. Having considered the memoranda
submitted by the parties, the Court finds that Petitioner's Motion should be DENIED and Respondent's
Motion should be GRANTED.
^12
On July 25, Petitioner brought his Petition for Judicial Review of Administrative Order, to challenge
Respondent's determination, through informal procedures, that Petitioner should receive a public reprimand
for certain violations of the Utah Rules of Professional Responsibility. Petitioner asserts that he entitled to
review in district court, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-l 5. which allows an individual to obtain
review of an informal agency adjudication tiuough a trial de novo in district court. Because, he believes
he is entitled to review. Petitioner argues that a preliminary injunction is necessary to keep the Bar from
publishing his reprimand before the Court has the opportunity to afford him a trial de novo. In response, the
Bar argues that it is not a state agency and that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the Bar's
informal disciplinary procedures.
Tj3
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A governs preliminary injunctions. It provides that a preliminary
injunction may issue only upon a showing by the applicant that;
(!)

The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction
issues;

(2)

The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the
proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined;

(3)

The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest;
and

(4)

There is a substantia] likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits
of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits
which should be the subject of further litigation.

hah R. Civ. p. 65A('ej. Although the Court finds that Petitioner has satisfied the first three
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because there is not a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the
underlying claim for the reasons detailed below. Specifically, the Court agrees with Respondent that
this Court is without jurisdiction to review informal State Bar actions. Thus, while this case appears
to present a serious issue on the merits which should be the subject of further litigation, that litigation
cannot proceed w this cowl on the asserted basis for jurisdiction. 1

^4
First, contrary to Petitioner's argument the Court concludes it does not have jurisdiction
under Utah Code Arm. § 63-46b-l 5 because the Utah State Bar is not a "stale agency.5' Although
this issue appears to be a question of first impression, there are a number of indications in Utah law
that the State Bar is not a "slate agency." First Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 outlines the jurisdiction
of the district courts. Section 78-3-4(3) says that "The district court has jurisdiction over all mailers
of lawyer discipline consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court.'" while subsection (7) confers
jurisdiction upon district courts to review agency adjudicative proceedings. This implies that agency
proceedings are different than lawyer discipline proceedings. Second. Utah case law has said that
review of State Bar actions is different than review of administrative decisions. See In re Discipline
ofBabilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997) ("it is imperative to bear in mind that the review of
attorney discipline proceedings is fundamentally different from judicial review of administrative
proceedings or of other district court cases." Internal citations and quotations omitted.)). Finally and
most persuasively, in Barnard v. Utah Stale Bar. 804 P.2d 526 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court
held that the Utah State Bar is not a "state agency" within the scope and meaning of the Records Act
and the Writings Act. While the Barnard Court specifically stated that it was not deciding whether
the Utah State Bar was a "state agency" for any other purpose, such as the federal Civil Rights Act
{id. at 527). its reasoning is persuasive here. Since the statutory provision authorizing judicial review
of state agency action is" inapplicable here, the proposed Bar sanction cannot be brought for court
review under Section 63~46b-15.
T|5
Second, the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability specifically foreclose a district
court from reviewing this Bar decision. Rule 10 governs prosecution and appeals. It provides that
a disciplinary proceedings is begun by filing an informal complaint. See R. 1 0(a)(1). Following
investigation and attempts to resolve the complaint, if the complaint is not dismissed, it goes before
a screening panel for a hearing. See R. 10(b). Following the hearing, the screening panel makes a
determination that sanctions are not warranted, to impose a form of discipline (with public reprimand
being the most severe sanction), or to file a formal complaint against the respondent with the district
court. Id. If the screening panel recommends public reprimand, the respondent may file an
exception with the Committee chair and the chair will review the exception and determine whether
to uphold the recommendation of the screening panel. See R. 10(c). If the Committee chair affirms
the decision of the screening panel, there is no other review process provided. However, if the panel
decides to file a formal complaint, then the district court will review the complaint, hold hearings.

1

The Court expresses no view on whedier tiiere is 2 substantial likelihood that Peutioner will
prevail on the merits of his underlying clairo if 2. pennon is properlv raised before the Ltah Supreme
r,nnrr The- Oniri oniv finds dial PeuDoner cannot prevail on this Petition because this Court
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etc. and enter a decision. The district court's decision is then subject to review- by the Utah Supreme
Court. See Rule ]]/
ORDER
<\\6
Because this Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Preview of
Administrative Order, and is foreclosed by Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability from reviewing disciplinary sanctions imposed following an informal process, the Court
must DENY Petitioner's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and GRANT Respondent's Motion
to Dismiss the Petition for Judicial Review.
Entered by the Court this j_Z^ day of October, 2006. __

2

As noted above, tins matte]: has been pursued under OPCs informal process sanctioned by
Rule 1 0 and, as a result, Petitioner has no right to obtain judicial review of the proposed sanction in
any court. Since Petitioner does not appear to have available to him any other "plain, speedy and
adequate remedy/' it may well be drat Petitioner's only option is to seek relief directly from the Utah
Supreme Court
Although Petitioner has not expressly raised a Due Process argument, die Court is troubled
by die fact dial die Rules authorize a public reprimand as a possible sanction in both formal and
informal disciplinary proceedings, but judicial review is only available if that sanction is imposed in a
formal proceeding. What's more, it appears that OPC has die exclusive authority to determine
whether to msurute formal proceedings. Sec Rules 10. J \. Utah Rulei of Laywer Discipline and
r-nc<,;-,-.nm- Lr o ir.inimiiiT; rm< i< or- issue that should receive further examination bv the appropriate
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IN THE THIRD 1UDIC1AL DISTRICT COURT
Dx1 AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

Ti avis Bow en,
Petitioner,

])
]

v

J

The Utah State Bar,
Respondent

])
)

Petitioner's Notice of Withdrawal

Civil No 060912210
Judge Denise Lmdberg

Tiavis Bow en, by and thiough lus attorney of tecoid, Gregory G Skordas hereby
withdraws his Petition Foi Judicial Review of Adniimstiative Ordei m the above entitled mattci
on the following gi ounds

SUMMARY OF RELE> ANT F4CTS
On lanuary 19, 2006 Petitionei appealed befoie a Scieemng Panel of the Ethics and
Discipline Committee of the Utah Supi erne Court fthe "Scj eemng Panel") One of the tin ee

pane] members was Christine Greenwood, of Magleby & Greenwood P.C.] Ms. Greenwood's
partner and the registered agent for Greenwood & Magleby is James E. Magleby. Mr. Magelby
is the lead counsel for plaintiff in Neff'v. Ncff el. ai, case number 030100275, pending in the lsl
District Coun., State of Utah, before Judge Low, m which Petitioner is a named defendant. Ms.
Greenwood did not disclose that her law firm was currently representing the plaintiff in a million
dollar lawsuit against him.
The Screening Panel made findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that
Petitioner had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.
publically reprimand Petitioner.

The Screening Panel voted to

Counsel for Travis Bowen requested an exception to the

findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Panel to the Committee Chair. The
Committee Chair adopted the Screening Panel's findings of fact, conclusions of law and
recommendation of public reprimand On July 7, 2006. Petitioner received the Final Order .
On July 25, 2006, he petitioned this Court for review of the Screening Panel's findings
and the Order for public reprimand. Petitioner requested an order from this Court prohibiting
the Office of Professional Conduct, Utah State Bar, (the "OPC") from publishing the reprimand
until after he had the benefit of judicial review of the Screening Panel's findings.
On August 15, 2006, the OPC filed a motion to dismiss claiming that this Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and that Petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
On September 1, 2006, Petitioner filed an opposition to the OPC's motion to dismiss,
arguing that he was entitled to judicial review of the Screening Panel's findings prior to issuance

1

Magleby & Greenwood has been registered with the Utah Department of Commerce
since January 26, 2005.

of the public remand. The OPC replied on Seplembei 8, 2006 and on September 12, 2006 filed a
request to submit for decision.
After all of the pleadings had been filed, while the matter was pending before this Court,
the OPC published the reprimand m the September/October edition of the Utah Bar Journal,
without regard for this Court's ability and authority to decide the matter for itself
On September 19, 2006, just a few short days after the OPC published the public
reprimand in the Bar Journal, Mr. Magelby appeared before Judge Low to argue against
Petitioner's motion for summary judgment in the Neffv. Neff'case. Magleby produced a copy of
the Bar Journal and argued that the public reprimand was evidence of Petitioner's dishonesty and
should be considered by the court in denying the motion for summary judgment. On October 45
2006, Magleby motioned the court to supplement the record with the public reprimand.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner sought judicial intervention from this Court asking for an order prohibiting the
OPC from publishing the public reprimand until he could obtain review of the Screening Panel's
findings.

Before this Court could decide the jurisdictional issues raised by the parties, the OPC

published the reprimand. Within days, the partner of the one of the Screening Panel members
used the reprimand in litigation against Petitioner that had been pending during the disciplinary
proceedings.
The OPC's actions indicate that it does not recognize the authority of this Court to
resolve the jurisdictional and legal issues raised by Petitioner and is under no obligation to await
its ruling on the matter. The OPC noted m its Memorandum m Support of Motion to Dismiss
thai the Utah Supreme Court has authority to regulate the practice of law. including discipline of

attorneys few pi ofessional misconduct

A.ccojdingly Petitioner Jespcctfull) withdiaws his

Petition foi iclief from this Court and will file with the Utah Supieme Court for levies of
OPC s actions m this case
DATED this / 6

day of October, 2006

SKORD AJS C^S?ON & HYDE

Grtejgory G Skordas
All<|ntey far Petitioner

rF.RTTFICATF OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby state undei penalty of perjury that 1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be mailed, pre-postage paid, first class mail to:

Kate Toomey
Billy Walker
Office of Professional Conduct
645 S. 200 E., Suite 205
Sail Lake City, UT 84111

Dated this

\r-\

day of October, 2006

. 0 ) ^ ^ i )AV^c^^/d

Kathenne A Fox f527B,
General Counsel
Utan Staie Bai
045 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 64111

Telephone (801)297-7047
Fa/ (801)531-0050

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)

In Re
Utah State Bar

)
)
)

Petition IO Amend me Rules of
Lawyer Discipline and Disability

)

Petitioner

)
)

THE UTAH STATE BAR by and through its General Counsel Kathenne A Fox
hereby petmons the Court to amend the Rules for Lawyer Discipline and Disability (the
"Rules") The proposed changes encompass editing changes for clarity and interna!
consistency as well as more substantive revisions to improve the disciplinary process
Foi the Court's convenient reference, an addendum which accompanies this petition
contains a copy of the current Rules, a copy of the re'dlme version of the Rules and a
copy of the final veision of the Rules wrtn the pioposed modifications incorporated ""^ne
proposed changes weie posted foi several months on tne Bar s weo site and member
comment was invited As of tne deadline of January 31 2002 two comments weie
suomitred botn of wnich nave been included in tne addendum

BACKGROUND
The Utah Supreme Court approved the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
in May 1993 when the disciplinary system) was modified to delegate authority to the
state district courts instead of the Board of Bar Commissioners (the "Commission") in
order to adjudicate formal complaints against attorneys

1

In recommiending adoption of

the Rules to the Court, the Court's Advisory Committee on the Rules of Professional
Conduct contemplated that the disciplinary rules would need revision from time to time,
and in fact, the Rules have been periodically amended/
Beginning in 1998 James C. Jenkins, President of the Bar, met with Office of
Professional Conduct Senior Counsel Billy L. Walker to explore the feasibility of several
amendments to streamline and decrease the cost of the disciplinary process. The
Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"; had previously reviewed the Rules and arrived
at a number of suggestions to clarify aspects of the disciplinary process, address
problems relating to the 1993 Rules that had surfaced, incorporate selected language
taken from the ABA Model Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement and generally
make the disciplinary process .more efficient. In the spring of 2000, the Commission
discussed the suggested changes, but required additional information to make a final

The new Rules became effective July 1, 1993 and replaced the former Proceduies of Discipline
" Since 1993, tne followinci Rules have been amended as follows Rule 3 (Etnics and Discipline
Committee) to a3d provisions foi alternates on screening panels or March 26 1995, Rule 3 (Etnics and
Discipline Committee; ic increase tne number of alternates serving on screening panels on Decembei 25
1997 Rule 3 (Etnics anc Discipline Committee; to increase numoer of screening pane! puoiic members
on January 26, 1999, Rule 3 (Ethics anc Discipline Committee; to change tne Office of Professional
Conduc* Annua' Reoor- dje caie or Way '5, 2000 Ruie 4 (Office of Pioiessiona. Concjjc* Counsel/to
cnange titles of Office of Attorn e\ Discipline to Office o Drofessionat Conduc anc Cnief Disciplinary
Counse tc 3emo- Counse on Decemoe" 2c "99" anc Aon 8 "998 anc Rule 8 Pencci: Assessnen of
_3vye-s tc "eins;a"£ oeiinouen' tee to- suspenoec attorneys or Aon "6 "999

^ n a t i o n

.n the fa. Bar President Dav,d Mufler appointed a Rules Review

Subcommittee (the -Subcommittee-, consisting of Commissioners John A Adams.

commendations to the Commission for overall improvement. The Subcommittee me,
numerous times, and a. times included Biily L. WaiKer. James B Lee, Ethics and
Disciplinary Committee chair, and R. Clark Arnold, Ethics and Disciplinary Committee
;6-chair.

in several of those meetings. The proposed modifications to the P.uies which

VIC

appp

, , . * . „ pytersive review and discussion at regularly
ar below were approved atter exiensix

I P
ii.u. 4 IHIV ?7 Auqust 24 and December
scheduled Commission meetings on June 6, July 4, July - / , Aug

7,2001.
The contents of this petition are organized to reflect h o * the four components of

changes to the "table of contents," the "compiler's notes" and the -summary.' aii of
w h i cn

precede the Rules ,n the Code, are listed before the proposed amendments to

Model Poles for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, the same has been noted. F i n * ,
care has been taken to identify proposed changes which are, or even could be
r,Hin-.irh^as°s an asterisk appears before
considered to be, substantive in naiure and in ,uch -as.s,

the particular Rule.

THE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION
Rule 30 (Costs)
*

Rule 30: Editing change reflects a proposed substantive change in Rule 30.

The title of Rule 30 in the table of contents has been modified to aad "attorneys fees" to
evidence the proposed change that grants the district court discretion to award attorney
fees against a respondent when the defense was without merit and not asserted in good
faith. (For a more complete description of the changes, see the explanation below
under Rule 30 in the Rules section.)
Rule 32 (Failure to answer charges)
*

Rule 32(a) and (b): Editing change in the table of contents reflects the proposed

addition of a new Rule. Rule 32(a) provides that at the screening panel level, a
respondent's failure to answer charges which have been filed constitutes an admission
of the allegations but only if actual notice was received. Rule 32(b) provides that failure
to appear before a screening panel hearing, after receipt of actual notice, constitutes an
admission of the allegations. (For a more complete description of the changes, see the
explanation below, under Rule 32 in the Rules section.)

THE COMPILER'S NOTES SECTION
Compilers Notes: No changes

/

THE SUMMARY SECTION
Summary: Editing changes only; adds numeric equivalents for the words
"three" and "four."

THE RULES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY

Rule 1 (Purpose, authority, scope and structure
of lawyer discipline and disability)
Rule 1(a): No changes.
Rule 1(b): Editing changes only; spells out the abbreviated word "art." and
substitutes the word "section" in lieu of the section symbol (§) which appears in the
current Rule.
Rule 1(c): No changes.
Rule 1(d): No changes.

Rule 2 (Definitions)
Rule 2(a): No changes.
Rule 2(b): No changes
Rule 2(c): No changes.
Rule 2(d): Editing changes oniy; adds '!OPC" tc the definition of "complainant"
in mailers where OPC determines to open an investigation based on information it
receives. Trie change is needed 10 codify what already occurs in practice and provides

consistency with current Rule 10(a)(1) which authorizes, in part, OPC counsel to initiate
an informal complaint against an attorney for misconduct.
Rule 2(e):

Editing changes only; adds a definition for OPC "Senior Counsel"

and further refines the definition of "OPC Counsel."

*

Rule 2(f):

No changes.

Rule 2(g):

No changes.

Rule 2(h):

Both substantive and editing change; provides a definition for the

currently existing "NOIC5) or "Notice of Informal Complaint" referenced in Rule 10.
Rule 2(i): Editing changes only; replaces the term "OPC" with the word "Office"
since the "Office" referred to throughout the Rules is the Bar's Office of Professional
Conduct. Change also re-numbers subsection to accommodate new subsection (h)
above.
Rule 2(j):

Editing change only; re-numbers subsection to accommodate new

subsection (h) above.
Rule 2(k): Editing change only; re-numbers subsection to accommodate new
subsection (h) above.

Rule 3 (Ethics and discipline committee)
Rule 3(a):

Editing changes only; spells out the number "26" and provides

numeric equivalents for numerous spelled-out numbers for clarification purposes.
Rule 3(a)(1):

No changes

o

Rule 3(b): Editing changes only; replaces the word "base" with the more
appropriate word "basis" and clarifies that the "chair" referenced in this subsection is the
chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee versus a screening panel chair.
Rule 3(c): Editing changes only; clarifies that the "vice chair,! referenced in this
subsection is the vice chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee versus a screening
panel vice chair.
*

Rule 3(dJ: Both substantive and editing changes; substantive amendments

provide that when a screening panel of four members is convened, the chair or vice
chair of a Ethics and Discipline screening panel shall act as a tie-breaker. Currently., the
number for a quorum is four and consists of three members of the Bar and one pubiic
member. There are no tie breaking procedures and OPC has had at least one instance
where a screening panel voted in a tie which resulted in no decision. The proposed
revisions also change the number of Committee members required to constitute a
quorum to three persons consisting of two Bar members and one pubiic member. The
number three instead of five is suggested because it is easier to convene a smaller
number of people than a larger number.. Editing changes aiso correct the misspelling of
the word "or" to "of," make the word "member" plural where needed, and provide
numeric equivalents for numerous spelled out numbers. Finally, while proposed
revisions do not increase the actual number of public members on the Ethics and
Discipline Committee, the four screening panels are now organized with two public
members instead of one.

Ruie 3(d)(1):

Editing changes only; capitalizes the first letter of the word

"committee" in three different places to make clear reference is being made to the
Ethics and Discipline Committee outlined in Rule 3.
Rule 3(e):

Editing changes only; proposed revisions substitute the abbreviated

term "OPC" for the word disciplinary" which is more consistent with the prior name
change of "Office of Attorney Discipline" to "Office of Professional Conduct/' In addition,
reference to the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct has been made because those
rules provide the basis upon which an attorney should conform his or her conduct.
*

Ruie 3(f):

Substantive change; this subsection has been deleted and

reformulated into other more detailed subsections which appear below as Rule 3(f)(1)
through (4). Rule 3(f) as currently written allows any party or a screening panel to
request under seal of the court a subpoena allowing discovery prior to the filing of a
formal complaint (with a five day notice generally being issued). One reason OPC
seldom uses this Rule is that it is unduly cumbersome. When used by the respondent
or complainants, however, the informal disciplinary process is often diverted to
irrelevant issues and the entire process is delayed.
*

Rule 3(f)(1):

Substantive change; the proposed amendments grant the power to

OPC counsel to issue investigatory subpoenas 'with the approval of the chair of the
Ethics and Discipline Committee. The change and the language is, in large part, based
on Ruie 14 of the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement promulgated by the
ABA's Center for Professional Responsibility. These changes are sougnt to improve
efficiency and to reduce the cost of the investigatory process in discipline mailers.
Currently, prior io filing a forma! complaint for good cause shown, subpoenas can be

obtained by any party who files a petition under seal with the district court. When used,
this process can slow down case processing by allowing complainants and/or
respondents to divert the informal disciplinary process to tangential issues. The
proposed language is feasible because prior to the filing of formal changes, the
disciplinary process is more an administrative-type investigation, investigatory
subpoenas only will be obtained when independent evidence is needed (e.g., bank
records) that the respondent or complainant is unwilling to provide to OPC or where
there are unwilling witnesses who refuse to testify. As a safeguard OPC counsel may
only use the subpoena power with the approval of the Ethics and Discipline Committee
Chair.
*

Rule 3(f)(2) and (3) and (4): Substantive changes; the Utah Pxules of Civil

Procedure and in particular, Rule 45 governing subpoenas, witness fees and mileage
reimbursement, will-now apply under these proposed revisions. Enforcement of the
subpoena can be sought through the district court. The respondent or complainant is
protected in that he or she is accorded the right to file a motion to quash the subpoena if
its appropriateness or validity is questioned.
±

Rule 3(g): Substantive and editing changes; editing changes substitute the term

'OPC" for the word "disciplinary" in three places for reason stated above in proposed
changes to Rule 3(e). The reference to word "time" should be plural (i.e., "times") to
make sentence grammatically correct. A more substantive revision also inserts the
phrase "during a [screening panel] hearing" after the phrase 'screening panel" and
before the phrase "the respondent . . . ." in the last semence of the first paragraph. This
is ic clarify -what is already implicit in oractioe: that the respondent has the right xo be

present during a hearing if OPC is present. A proposed editing amendment also inserts
the word ,1the,, after the word " o f and before the word "subsequenf in the second to last
iine of the second paragraph for language clarity. Finally, editing-type changes add the
numeric equivalent of the word "three."
Rule 3(h):

Editing changes only; substitutes the term "OPC" for the word

"Office" for consistency reasons. A proposed amendment also changes the word
"ethical" to "ethics11 (as it modifies "opinion") as it is an informal ethics advisory opinion
that is being referenced.

Rule 4 (QPC counsel)
Rule 4(a):

Editing changes only; deletes the redundant word "staff" and

substitutes the word "payment" for the word "profit" since attorneys in OPC should be
barred from engaging in private practice which could involve conflicts of interest rather
than be prohibited from engaging in legal service for profit which implies an income
analysis.
Rule 4(b) and 4(b)(1) and (2) and (3): Editing changes only; adds the modifier
"the" in Rule 4(b) and substitutes the term "OPC" for the word "Office" in Rule 4(b)(1)
and (2) and (3). in subsection 4(b)(3) for consistency purposes, the revision also
references the proposed changes in Rule 10, i.e., "for each matter not covered in Rule
10" brought to the attention of OPC.
Rule 4(b)(3)(A):

No changes.

Rule 4(b)(3)(B):

No changes.

Rule 4(b)(3)(C):

No changes.
J0

Rule 4(b)(3)(D): Editing change only; makes clear what is already implicit, i.e.,
an OPC petition to transfer attorneys to disability status must be fiied in the district
court.
*

Rule 4(b)(4): Substantive change; defines the duties of OPC counsel to include

prosecuting disciplinary matters and proceedings for transfer to disability status before
any court (which would include the federal courts).
*

Rule 4(b)(5): Substantive changes; more accurately details that OPC should

"attend" Character and Fitness Committee proceedings rather than actually "represent"
OPC at these proceedings since attendance is needed to gather information for
subsequent representation of OPC in connection with readmission cases in the district
court under Ruie 25. Also, changes specify that OPC may appear before any court in
matters of reinstatement and readmission in order to mirror the proposed changes in
Rule 4(b)(4) above.
*

Rule 4(b)(6); Both substantive and editing changes; formally adds to the duties

of OPC counsel the supervision of volunteer attorneys who monitor the practice of
respondents who have been placed on probation. Editing change also expressly allows
OPC counsel to "appoint" as well as "employ" these volunteer attorneys as these
volunteer attorneys are not paid for their oversight responsibilities.
Rule 4(b)(7): No changes.
Rule 4(b)(8): Editing change only; more clearly delineates that any discipline
which has been imposed on an attorney, and of which notice is provided to other
licensing jurisdictions, must be public discipline. Currently, Ruie 4(b)(8) reads that other

licensing jurisdictions are notified when a Utah attorney is suspended or disbarred or
subject to other public discipline.
Rule 4(b)(9): Editing change only; more clearly delineates that when OPC
seeks to impose reciprocal discipline, that any discipline imposed by the other licensing
jurisdiction must be public discipline, e.g., a suspension or disbarment
*

Rule 4(b)(10): Substantive and/or editing change; strikes the seemingly

superfluous phrase "in other respects."
*

Ruie 4(b)(i1): Substantive and/or editing change; as this Rule currently reads it

would appear that OPC is required to maintain a permanent record of "transcripts of all
proceedings," implying that transcripts should be produced in all proceedings so that a
permanent record can be maintained. The proposed change would seem to indicate
that only in cases where a transcript is actually produced is OPC under such an
obligation.
Rule 4(b)(12): Editing change only; adds numeric equivalent of the word
"seven,"
Rule 4(b)(12)(A): Editing changes only; replaces the word "office" with the term
"OPC" and in the word "respondent," replaces the upper case "R" with a lower case V
Also, this subsection was not specifically numbered before and has now become
subsection "(A)."
Rule 4(b)(12)(B): Editing changes only; replaces the word "office" with the term
"OPC" and in the 'word "expungement," replaces the upper case "E,! with a iower case
"e,! for consistency purposes. Also, this subsection was not specifically numbered
before and it now has become subsection "(3)."

*

Rule 4(b)(13): Substantive change: expressly allows OPC to publish results of

all disciplinary proceedings (while maintaining the confidentiality of respondents subject
to private discipline) in the Utah Bar Journal which is consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in the Pendleton case/
Rule 4(b)(14): Editing change only; replaces the word "office" with the term
"OPC" for consistency purposes.
*

Rule 4(c): Substantive change; this new subsection expressly subjects former

OPC counsel to Rule 1.11 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct concerning
successive government and private employment. The proposed change disqualifies
former OPC counsel from representing in disciplinary proceedings any such lawyer who
was previously investigated or prosecuted.

Rule 5 (Expenses)
Rule 5(a); No changes.
Rule 5(b): Editing changes only; replaces the phrase "OPC counsel" to "Senior
Counsel" to more accurately reflects that OPC's Senior Counsel rather than a staff
attorney should prepare that office's budget.

Rule 6 (Jurisdiction)
Rule 6(a): Editing changes; clarifies that OPC"s and the district court's
jurisdiction extends to formerly admitted Utah lawyers for acts that violate the rules of
any disciplinary authority where the lawyer was licensed at the time of committing the
act. The change codifies the intent and understanding that attorneys are subject to
Utah discipline for alleged misconduct in other states. Editing changes also include
replacing the word "office" with the term "OPC" and adding the modifier "Supreme"
before "Court."
*

Rule 6(b): Substantive change; while full-time judges are still only accountable

to OPC for conduct that occurred prior to their taking of office, after leaving office a
judge who is also a lawyer will now expressly be subject to OPC for any misconduct that
occurred while the lawyer was a judge if the misconduct would have been grounds for
lawyer discipline. Currently, if the Utah Supreme Court makes a final determination
about a judge's misconduct after the judge left office, even though the misconduct was
grounds for lawyer discipline, OPC has no jurisdiction. Pursuant to a July 2001 letter
from the late Senator Pete Suazo to Chief Justice Richard C. Howe and the Judicial
Council, the Legislature vv/as concerned that when a judge is removed from office, ii did
not automatically follow that the judge's license to practice law was also affected.
*

Rule 6(c): Substantive change; clarifies that OPC's jurisdiction extends to part-

time judges for acts outside of their judicial capacity. The current Rule does not
specifically distinguish full-lime incumbent judges who cannot ha^e private legal
practices from pan-time incumbent judges who can engage in sucn practice.

Rule 7 (Roster of lawyers)
Rule 7: Editing changes only; the change from the phrase "OPC counsel" to the
word "Bar" acknowledges that while OPC is the particular office of the Bar that at times
needs ready access to the information set forth in this Rule, it is not OPC that collects
and maintains this information. In fact, as is the case with most integrated or unified bar
associations the Bars membership record database is maintained by the Ear's financial
and licensing office. For confidentiality reasons consistent with these Rules, Bar
policies differentiate between private and public information, and access to private
information is substantially limited within and without the Bar. No private information is
disclosed absent certain circumstances such as a decision by a court ordering the Bar
to release the confidential information pursuant to a subpoena.

Rule 8 (Periodic assessment of lawyers)
Rule 8(a): No changes.
Rule 3(b): Editing changes; minor revision spells out the amount of $100 in
writing. In addition, the term "Board of Commissioners" is replaced by the word "Bar55
since the Board other than setting policies, is not involved in the administrative function
of collecting licensing fees or suspending attorneys for nonpayment. Finally, Rule 8(b)
now specifies that the Bars Executive Director shall give notice to lawyers of their
suspension for nonpayment at their designated mailing address on record at the Bar.
The designated mailing address is the address lawyers specify on the licensing form to
which they want their mail sent. Currently, the Rule merely states that the Bar shall give

notice ai the "address on record5' but the Bar collects both home and business
addresses

Rule 9 (Grounds for discipline)
Ruie 9:

No changes.

Rule 9(a):

No changes.

Ruie 9(b):

Editing change; proposed amendment strikes the word '"or.'1

Rule 9(c):

Editing change; proposed punctuation change reflects that

subsection (c) is no longer the last Rule 9 subsection in a series and accommodates the
addition of new subsections (d), (e) and (f).
*

Rule 9(d) and (e) and (f):

Substantive changes; OPC often has a difficult time

obtaining information relating to: (1) a lawyer's conviction of a crime; (2) a lawyer's
public discipline in another jurisdiction; and (3) a lawyer's violation of the Rules of
Judicial Conduct while the lawyer is serving as a judge. New subsections (d) and (e)
within this Rule provide that a lawyer's failure to notify OPC of the enumerated
misconduct is in and of itself a ground for discipline. The proposed revisions are, in
large part, based upon a similar California disciplinary rule and are needed because on
a prima facia basis, these enumerated circumstances adversely reflect upon a lawyer's
fitness to practice law in accordance with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.

Rule 10 (Prosecution and appeals)
Rule 10(a):

No cnanges.

Ruie 10;aj ; 1j:

Nc changes
•t

*

Rule 10(a)(2): Both substantive and editing changes; the proposed language

providing that a person who files a complaint against an attorney must not only have his
or her signature notarized (which is the current requirement) but also must verify that
the information contained in the informal complaint is accurate was prompted at the
urging of Utah Senator Terry R. Spencer. Senator Spencer, who is an active member
of the Bar, met with the Commission and expressed his concerns about frivolous
attorney discipline complaints filed by disgruntled clients and others. While Senator
Spencer suggested a number of ways to reduce on the number of frivolous complaints
such as requiring the complainant to post a bond, the Commission believes that adding
the verification language was a reasonable compromise to address Senator Spencers
concerns and to protect the purpose and integrity of the attorney misconduct complaint
process. If OPC initiates an investigation as permitted by Rule 4(b) in conjunction with
Rule 10, this verification is not required since OPC may not have personal knowledge of
the misconduct but instead, may learn of it from other sources (such as the newspaper).
The term "OPC" is also substituted for the word "office" in the third line to be consistent
with the proposed amended definition in Rule 2(h).
Rule 10(a)(3): No changes.
Rule 10(a)(4): Editing change only; in order to more accurately caption this
subsection's content, Rule 10(a)(4)'s title has been changed from "OPC counsel" to
"Notice of informal complaint." The term "professional" [counsel] has also been
replaced by the term "OPC" [counsel] for accuracy.
Rule 10(a)(5): Editing changes only; the numbers 20 and 30 have been spelled
out.

*

Rule 10(a)(6):

Both substantive and editing changes; proposed changes

embody the idea that the dismissal of disciplinary cases should be based on probability,
not possibility. The amendments recognize that it is a waste of resources to investigate
and prosecute cases which are more likely than not to result in ultimate dismissal. In
addition to complaints which are frivolous, unintelligible and unsupported by facts,
complaints which are barred by the applicable statute of limitations or which are more
adequately addressed in another forum should be dismissed. 4 These latter two
concepts are new. Informal complaints which OPC declines to prosecute should also
be dismissed. This proposed addition codifies QPC's current practice of dismissing
complaints similar to the way screening panels are authorized to dismiss cases. Finally,
the proposed amendments clarify that the complainant may appeal all dismissals which
occur without a hearing to the chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. The
remainder of the changes are minor in nature and are proposed for editing clarification
and consistency.
Ruie 10(b):

No changes.

Rule 10(b)(1):

No changes.

Rule 10(b)(2):

Editing changes only; spells out the number "14" and provides

numeric equivalents for the numbers "six" and "five."
Rule 10(b)(3):

No changes.

Rule 10(b)(4):

No changes.

Rule 10(b)(5):

No changes.

i ne applicable statute o f limitations is four years. Examples o~ complaints "more adequately addressed
if other forums" induce criminal prosecutions and ineffective assistance o"' counsel claims.
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Rule 10(b)(5)(A) and (3) and (C): No changes.
Rule 10(b)(5)(D): Editing changes only; adds the numeric equivalent of the
number "ten."
±

Rule 10(b)(5)(E): Substantive change; this new subsection adds another choice

that a disciplinary screening panel can make after a hearing. Currently, the Ethics and
Discipline Committee only has the authority to issue private admonitions. Under this
new provision the Ethics and Discipline Committee would be given the authority to issue
public reprimands in addition to private admonitions. Under the current sanctions
standards the factual basis for a private admonition and a public reprimand is
essentially the same with the difference being the level of harm to the client, the legal
profession, or the administration of justice. (See Rule 4.4 and 4.5 of the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.) The change will allow the expedited resolution of similar
cases because it will eliminate the need to file formal complaints in the district court on
those cases that are only slightly above the standards for an admonition. This revision
will also allow OPC to avoid more expensive formal proceedings when the respondent
is willing to stipulate to a public reprimand and where an admonition does not
adequately address the conduct. As a practical matter, screening panels rarely, if at all,
vote a matter "formal" (i.e., find probable cause to send a case to the district court)
unless they believe the violation warrants suspension or disbarment. This is because
the time and expense required at the district court level is considerable, and it is often
difficult to justify the imposition of a "mere" public reprimand.
Rule 10(b)(5)(F):

Editing change only; re-numbers this subsection

commensurate with tne addition of new subsecxion 10(b)(5)(E) above.
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Ruie 10(b)(6): Editing change only; adds the numeric equivalent for the number
"five."
Rule 10(b)(7): No changes.
*

Rule 10(c): Substantive change; adds "public reprimands" to this subsection to

provide consistency with the proposed new subsection (10)(b)(5)(E) above vv'hich would
allow the Ethics and Discipline Committee to issue public reprimands. Minor editing
change also spells out the number "10."

Rule 11 (Proceedinas subsequent to finding of probable cause)
Rule 11{a): No changes.
Rule 11 (b): Editing change only; expressly states what is allowed under law:
OPC and the respondent may stipulate to a change in venue under current law (Utah
Code §78-13-9).
Rule 11 (c): Editing changes only; replaces the word "Office" with the term
"OPC" and the term "USB" with the word "Bar" for consistency purposes,
Rule 11(d): No changes.
*

Rule 11 (d)(1): Substantive change; Rule 11(d)(1) currently reads to permit-

either OPC or a respondent to file a notice of change requesting reassignment to
another judge in the same - or different - district. The Commission's Subcommittee did
not v^ant a respondent to avoid publicity relating to the disciplinary proceedings in the
district where the respondent practices. The proposed change therefore removes
OPC's and the respondent's option to request reassignment of the disciplinary matter to

a different judge in another district. There is also a minor editing change which adds the
numeric equivalent of the number "one.,!
Rule 11(d)(2): Editing change only; spells out the number "30."
Rule 11(d)(3): Editing change only; adds the phrase "of the Supreme Court" in
order to modify "Chief Justice" for clarity and identification purposes.
Rule 11(d)(4): Editing change only; replaces the lower case "a" to an upper
case "A" in the reference to "Rule 63a" contained in the title of this subsection.
Rule 11(e): No changes.
Rule 11(f): Editing changes; proposed amendment allows -what is implicit in that
a district court can expedite a sanctions hearing, This subsection addresses what
happens after a court makes a finding of misconduct and provides that a.sanctions
hearing should be held as soon as reasonably practicable and not more than thirty days
after the district court enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The intent of this
subsection is to ensure that the sanctions hearing is separate from the hearing if the
latter is needed for determining misconduct. However, because of the wording "as soon
as reasonably practicable," it is somewhat unclear whether the sanctions hearing can
be held the same day (i.e., in the afternoon) as the hearing for finding misconduct (i.e.,
in the morning). The amendment clearly states that the district court at its discretion
can hold a sanctions hearing immediately consecutive to the disciplinary proceeding on
the same day. Editing changes also spell out the number "30" and add the numeric
equivalent of the number "five."
*

Rule 11(g): Substantive change: proposed amendment broadens the current

Ruie TO -6cognize trie fact thai district courts may also enter orders of private discipline

and that both private and public orders of discipline can be appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Rule 12 (Sanctions')
Rule 12: No changes.

Rule 13 (Immunity)
#

Rule 13(a): Substantive change; proposed amendment refines the current Rule

and in this subsection, differentiates between immunity in civil suits and immunity in
criminal proceedings. The change designates and extends immunity from civil suit to:
(1) special counsel appointed by the Court under Rule 17(f); (2) supervising attorneys
who monitor lawyers who have been placed on probation; and (3) trustees appointed by
a Court under Rule 27 who oversee the closure of a law practice of an attorney who has
been placed on disability status. The Rule currently provides immunity from lawsuits for
"statements made during the course of disciplinary proceedings" (comparing the latter to
judicial proceedings) and is provided to "participants, district courts, committee
members, and OPC counsel and staff." The current Rule fails, however, to specifically
include special counsel who perform the identical work of OPC counsel, as well as
attorneys who supervise lawyers on probation and lawyer trustees. Although the term
"participants" may have been intended to cover these individuals, the amendment
makes it clearer. Minor editing changes also provide consistency in terminology.
*

Rule 13(b):

Substantive change; this is a new addition which would allow a

district court, upon notice to and consideration of the position of the prosecuting

authority, to grant a witness in a disciplinary proceeding immunity from criminal
prosecution. This change is patterned after the ABA's Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement
Model Rule 12 and will aid OPC's investigative efforts by allowing a reluctant witness in
fear of criminal prosecution to come forth to testify.

Rule 14 (Service)
Rule 14: No changes.

Rule 15 (Access to disciplinary information)
Rule 15(a): No changes.
*

Rule 15(a)(1): Substantive change; specifies that a respondents waiver of

confidentiality must be in writing.
Rule 15(a)(2): No changes.
Ruie 15(a)(3): Editing change only; replaces a period with a semicolon to reflect
a continuation of a series of subsections.
*

* Rule 15(b): Substantive change; explicitly recognizes that the filing of a motion

or petition for interim suspension is a public proceeding absent the exception of
issuance of a protective order.
Ruie 15(c) and (d): No changes.
Rule 15(e): Editing change, minor revisions tighten up the grammatical
construction of this subsection governing requests for nonpublic (confidential)
information.

Rule 15(e)(1): Editing changes only; minor revisions improve clarity and
readability.
Rule 15(e)(2): Editing changes only; minor revisions improve clarity and
readability.
*

Rule 15(f): Substantive change; proposed amendment states that respondents

shall be notified of requests for nonpublic information at their designated mailing
address rather than their business office address. As discussed above in Rule 8(b), the
designated mailing address is the address lawyers specify on the annual licensing form
to which they want their mail sent. The amendments also require that a respondent's
waiver to permit others to obtain nonpublic information must be in writing. The
remainder of the revisions are minor editing changes which improve clarity and
readability and spell out the number "21."
*

Rule 15(g): Both substantive and editing changes; editing changes improve

clarity and readability, substantive changes provide that any waivers of confidentiality
pertaining to subsection (e) above must be in writing.
Rule 15(g)(1) and (2) and (3): No changes.
*

Rule 15(h)(1) and (2): Substantive changes; proposed new provisions still allow

OPC counsel to disclose nonpublic information without notice to the respondent but only
under limited and specific circumstances when the disclosure is essential to the
furtherance of an ongoing OPC investigation, Without the ability to disclose selected
confidential information to potential witnesses in order to gain information in some
matters, OPC cannot complete its investigations.

Rule 1 5(i): Editing changes only; capitalizes the first letter in the word "rules'1 as
it refers to the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.

Rule 16 (Dissemination of disciplinary information)
*

Rule 16(a): Substantive change; this subsection currently lists which notices of

disciplinary information must be transmitted to various disciplinary agencies, the public
and the courts. The proposed addition obligates OPC to transmit such notices to the
Judicial Conduct Commission if the subject of the discipline is a sitting or former judge.
The disciplinary notice which heretofore has been inadvertently omitted from this
subsection is "resignation with discipline pending" (which is tantamount to disbarment)
and this omission has been added with the proposed amendments.
*

Rule 16(b): Substantive change; the proposed amendment requires the

Executive Director of the Bar rather than the Administrative Office of the Courts ("AOC")
to publish notices of disciplinary suspensions and disbarments as well as public
resignations with discipline pending and transfers to disability status. The change is
consistent with the Rule's original intent that such notice be given, but removes the
burden on the AOC pursuant to the AOC's request. In fact, insofar as the Bar has
ascertained, the AOC has never published these notices under the current Rule.
*

Rule 16(c): Substantive change; the proposed amendment requires the Bar's

Executive Director rather than the AOC to transmit notices of certain disciplinary
information to all Utah courts. As is the case with the proposed changes in subsection
(b) above, the AOC has requested the Bar to transmit these notices directly. Changes

also add the inadvertently omitted disciplinary category of "resignation with discipline
pending" to the list.

Rule 17 (Additional rules of procedure)
Rule 17(a): Editing change only; minor revision is proposed to improve
readability and consistency.
Rule 17(b): No changes.
*

Rule 17(c): Substantive and editing changes; the word "private" is eliminated to

correlate with the substantive changes proposed for Rules 10(b)(5)(E) and 10(c) which
give screening panels the authority to recommend public reprimands.
.. Rule 17(d): No changes.
Rule 17(e): No changes.
*

Rule 17(f): Substantive changes; proposed amendment expressly applies the

same procedures for handling attorney ethics complaints against Bar Commissioners
and OPC counsel as to members of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. The
proposed revisions also adopt the same grounds for dismissal of such complaints as the
grounds required for dismissal of all other attorney misconduct complaints. The
changes clarify that special counsel for handling such complaints is a lawyer other than
an OPC lawyer, that special counsel must be appointed by the Supreme Court, and that
special counsel shall report the results of the investigation to OPC. The proposed
changes in Rule 10(a)(6) dealing with dismissals of informal complaints have also been
incorporated into this Rule for consistency purposes.

26

Rule 18 (Interim suspension for threat of harm)
*

Rule 18(a): Substantive change; to comport with the Pendleton attorney

discipline decision the proposed modification to this subsection states that "an action is
covered under this rule when the petition for interim suspension is filed.,:S
Rule 18(b): Editing change only; minor grammatical revision replaces the word
"the" to the word "an."
Rule 18(b)(1): Ho changes.
Rule 18(b)(2): Editing changes only; proposed amendment replaces the word
"office" with the term "OPC" for consistency purposes.
Rule 18(c): No changes.
Rule 18(d): Editing change only; adds numeric equivalent of the number "two."

Rule 19 (Lawyers convicted of a crime)
*

Rule 19(a): Substantive change; this proposed new provision requires a lawyer

convicted of any crime to notify OPC in writing of that fact within 30 days after being
convicted. Heretofore, only crimes which adversely reflected on a lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects needed to be reported. The
current Rule leaves it in the hands of the convicted attorney to determine whether or not
a crime meets that standard. OPC believes it is in a better position to make that
decision.

in the rr;stie:~ cr the Discipline o f Gary W Pendleton, 11 P.3c 2o4 f'Jiar. 2000; 3* ^age 29o.

*

Rule 19(b): Both substantive and editing changes; proposed revisions comport

with new requirements in Rule 19(a) above for consistency purposes, including renumbering the subsection. The more important substantive amendment requires that
an attorney report all crimes to OPC, and not just those crimes which "reflect adversely
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer. . .."
*

Rule 19(c): Substantive change; to comport with the Pendleton disciplinary

opinion, this substantive revision states that an action is commenced under this Rule
when both the petition for interim suspension and the formal complaint are filed. 6
Proposed amendments also clarify that a respondent under the circumstances set forth
in Rule 19(c) is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing but may request an informal
hearing. This change is consistent with the provisions of current Rule 19 that state that
the district court shall place the respondent on interim suspension upon proof that the
respondent has been convicted of a crime which reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, regardless of the
pendency of any appeal. The proposed change is also consistent with the current
provision in Rule 19 which states that a certified judgment of conviction constitutes
conclusive evidence that the respondent committed the crime. These provisions seem
to indicate as a whole that the hearing a respondent attorney is entitled to is not an
evidentiary hearing to attack the facts underlying the conviction. In this regard, if a
hearing is to be held, it is to be held solely upon the issue of whether or not the crime
legally reflects adversely on the respondents honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer. Editing change re-numbers this subsection.

Rule 19(d), (e)s (f), (g) and (h): Editing changes only; proposed amendments
provide for re-numbering of subsections to comport with the addition of new subsection
(a) in Rule 19.

Rule 20 (Discipline bv consent)
~k

Rule 20(a): Substantive change; proposed amendment clarifies that a

respondent proposing discipline by consent must waive the right to a screening panel
hearing. It also deletes the cumbersome requirement that the proposed discipline by
consent first be submitted to the screening panel chair (as opposed to just the Ethics
and Discipline Committee Chair) before being presented to the Ethics and Discipline
Committee Chair for consideration. The remainder of changes are minor editing
revisions for consistency and clarity purposes.
Rule 20(b): Editing changes only; proposed minor revisions suggested for
clarity, readability and consistency purposes.
Rule 20(c): No changes.
* Rule 20(c)(1): Editing changes only; minor revisions for consistency purposes.
Rule 20(c)(2) and (3) and (4): No changes.
Rule 20(d): No changes.
Rule 20(d)(1) and (2) and (3) and (4): No changes.
*

Rule 20(d)(5): Substantive change; the current Rule reads that the respondent

shall submit an affidavit consenting to imposition of the approved disciplinary sanction
and acknowledging that the material facts alleged are true. The modifying phrase "for
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purposes of discipline" has been added to the beginning of the sentence in subsection
(d)(5). OPC has had a number of cases where consents to discipline have been placed
in jeopardy because although a respondent was willing to acknowledge the facts for
purposes of disciplinary proceedings, he or she was not willing to acknowledge them for
other purposes, e.g., criminal prosecutions or pending civil suits, etc. The proposed
limitation should not affect a respondent's exposure in those other types of proceedings
since the standard of proof differs in each of the other proceedings. This change is
consistent with a similar provision in the ABA's Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement.
Rule 20(d)(6): No changes.
Rule 20(e): Editing changes only; the proposed changes in the other
subsections of Rule 20 make current subsection (e) inaccurate and unnecessary and it
therefore should be deleted.

Rule 21 (Resignation with discipline pending)
Rule 21(a): Editing change; the current Rule provides that a respondent may
resign from the Bar prior to the adjudication of a pending complaint with the consent of
the Supreme Court and upon such terms as the Supreme Court may impose for the
protection of the public. The proposed amendment specifically states that a resignation
can be made only with the consent of the Supreme Court.
*

Rule 21(b)(1): Substantive change; consistent with the proposed amendment to

Rule 20(d)(5) and for reasons discussed therein, respondents should be required to
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admit for only the purposes of the disciplinary proceeding the facts upon which the
allegations of misconduct are based in order to resign with discipline pending
Ruie 21(b)(2) and (3) and (4) and (5): No changes.
Rule 21(b)(6): Editing change only; proposed amendment specifies that in
order to resign with discipline pending, respondents must agree to comply with all the
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability including Rule 26(b) regarding notices to
clients and return of clients' property. Rule 26(b) sets forth the exact requirements that
apply when a respondent winds up his or her legal practice.
Rule 21(b)(7): No changes.
Rule 21(c): Editing changes only; proposed change spells out equivalent of the
number "20" and adds the numeric equivalent of the number "ten/5
Ruie 21(d): No changes.
Ruie 21 (e): Editing changes only; proposed change specifies that respondents
who resign with discipline pending must comply with Ruie 25 governing re-admissions
to the Bar. The specification makes explicit what is already implicit: a resignation with
discipline pending is tantamount to disbarment.
±

Rule 21(f): Substantive changes; proposed subsection (f) is entirely new. Trie

proposed amendments allow an attorney to resign with discipline pending when the
allegations of iegal misconduct, if proven, may not justify disbarment. In such cases,
the respondent must comply with requirements set forth in this subsection. The
requirements differ from those imposed by subsections (b) and (c) in that: (1) the
respondent need not admit that the facts constitute grounds for discipline and that the

admittance is for purposes of the disciplinary proceedings only: and (2) the provisions
contained in subsection (c) do not apply.

Rule 22 (Reciprocal discipline)
±

Rule 22(a): Substantive change; the current Rule states that a lawyer admitted

to practice law in Utah shall promptly inform OPC that he or she has been publicly
disciplined by another regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction. The proposed
revision replaces the word "promptly" with a definitive time period of 30 days. The
remaining changes are minor editing changes.
Rule 22(b) and (b)(1): No changes.
Rule 22(b)(2). (d) and (e): Editing changes only; proposed revision spells out
equivalent of the number "30" and more accurately rephrases "in all other aspects"
except as provided in [subsections] (c) and (d) above.

Rule 23 (Proceedings in which lawyer is declared to be
Incompetent or alleged to be incapacitated)
*

Rule 23(a): Both substantive and editing changes; provides that in cases where

no guardian or legal representative has been appointed for a lawyer on disability status,
a copy of the court's order shall be served on the director of the institution to which the
lawyer has been committed.
Rules 23(b) and (c) and (d)(1)-(4); No changes.

Rule 23(d)(5): Editing changes only; more appropriate sentence structure more
accurately states that the Ear rather than the Bar Examiners Committee certifies
successful completion of the Bar examination for admission to practice.
Rule 23(d)(6) and (7):

No changes.

Rule 24 (Reinstatement following a
suspension of six months or less)

*

Rule 24: Substantive change; proposed amendment imposes new requirement

that a respondent file an affidavit with OPC stating that he or she has fully reimbursed
the Client Security Fund for amounts paid on account of the respondent's misconduct in
reinstatement cases following a suspension of six months or less. Editing changes spell
out the equivalent of the number "10" and provide the numeric equivalent of the number
"six."

Rule 25 (Reinstatement following a s u s p e n s i o n
of more than six months: readmission)
Rule 25(a): Editing changes only; proposed amendment's provide numericequivalents of various spelled out numbers.
*

Rule 25(b):

Substantive changes; proposed amendment eliminates an advance

cost deposit for petitions for reinstatement to cover the anticipated costs of the
reinstatement proceeding because this requirement has not been imposed in practice.
Another suostaniive revision requires a respondent seeking readmission to receive a
report and recommendation from the Bars Character and Fitness Committee before

filing a. petition in the district court. Ho where is it specified in either the Rules
Governing Admission or the Rules for Lawyer Discipline and Disability whether the
petitioner should apply for readmission and undergo a character and fitness review
before or after filing a petition with the district court. The Commission, based on
recommendations from OPC and the Bar's Admission Committee, believes it makes
more sense to have the character and fitness evaluation readily available for the district
court's review in conjunction with the former attorney's petition. A further revision
makes clear that a petitioner is obligated to fulfill the remainder of admission
requirements (such as educational requirements and payment of fees) before being
eligible for admission pursuant to district court order.
Rule 25(c): No changes.
Rule 25(d): Editing changes; minor amendments spell our the number "30."
Rule 25(e)(1) and (2) and (3) and (3)(A): No changes.
Rule 25(e)(3)(B): Editing change; minor amendment provides numeric
equivalent of the number "six."
Rule 25(e)(3)(C): No changes.
*

Rule 25 (e)(4): Substantive change; this subsection's proposed revisions

provide that a respondent who seeks readmission (after disbarment) must give OPC a
copy of the Bar's Character and Fitness Committee's report and recommendation. The
changes also provide that a copy of the report should be forwarded to the district court
assigned to the petition for readmission after the respondent files the petition. These
changes clarify the order of some of the sieps a respondent must take in order to be
considered for readmission.

Rule 25(e)(5):

No changes

Rule 25(e)(6):

Editing changes, provides numeric equivalent for the spelled out

number 'one.1'
Rule 25(e)(7):

Ho changes.

Rule 25(e)(8):

Substantive change, subsection (e)(8) which is new expressly

requires thai a respondent fully reimburse the Client Security Fund for any amounts the
Bar has paid on account of the respondent attorney's misconduct.
Rule 25(f):

Editing change; minor amendment adds spelled out word "sixty."

Rule 25(g):

Editing changes; provides spelled out numeric equivalent of "90. r

Rule 25(h): Editing changes; provides numeric equivalent of ihe number "one."
Rule 25(1): No changes.
Rule 25(j):

Editing changes; adds spelled out number "twenty."

Rule 26 (Notice of disability or suspension; return
of clients' property: refund of unearned fees)

Rule 26(a): Editing change only; minor revision adds spelled out equivalent of
the number "30."
Rule 25(b):

Editing changes only; provides numeric equivalent of "siy" and

spelled out equivalent of the number "20."
Rule 26(b)(1) through (6):
Rule 26(b)(7):

Editing change' provides spelled out equivalent of The number

"10"
Rule 26ic;:

Ho changes.

No onanges

Rule 26(d): Editing change; provides numeric equivalent of the number "six."
Rule 26(e): No changes.

Rxile 27 (Appointment of trustee to protect clients' interest when lawyer
disappears, dies, is suspended or disbarred, or is transferred to disability status)

Rule 27(a) and fb):
*

No changes.

Rule 27(c): Substantive change; proposed amendment expressly provides

immunity for a person appointed under Rule 30 as a trustee the change is
commensurate with the proposed changes in Rule 13.

Rule 28 (Appeal by complainant)
Rule 28: Editing change; any dismissal, just not a "summary" dismissal, may be
appealed under Rule 10(a)(6).

Rule 29 (Statute of limitations)
Rule 29: Editing change only; adds the numeric equivalent of spelled out
number "four."

Rule 30 (Costs and attorney fees)
±

Rule 30(a): Substantive change; makes discretionary rather than mandatory the

award of costs against a respondent when OPC prevails The proposed amendments
also grant rhe court discretion to award attorney fees against a respondent when tne
Defense vvaE: >,vi:hoj' merr or no: asserted in gooo faitn Autnor.zmo CPC tc coliect

attorney fees in successful cases may provide a deterrent and a quicker resolution in
those cases where attorneys lack a meritorious defense. In such cases, respondents
often have nothing to lose regarding expenditure of attorney fees since they either
represent themselves o\' their attorney friends or relatives represent them pro bono.
Under the proposed change, attorney fees may be charged for work performed
beginning with the filing of the formal complaint. Finally, the proposed revisions also
expressly exclude a respondent's entitlement or award of attorney fees. Currently, a
respondent is not entitled to costs.
Rule 30(b): No changes.
*

Rule 30(c): Substantive change; proposed amendment recognizes an exception

(set forth in new subsection (d) below) to the general rule that costs should not be
recoverable in disability cases.
*

Rule 30(d): Substantive change; proposed amendment allows trustees to

coiiect costs for notification to a respondent's clients. The reason for the change is the
belief that trustees who donate time to attorney disability cases should not be
responsible for costs associated with their volunteer efforts such as charges for posiage
or copying.

Rule 31 (Noncompliance with child support order, child visitation order,
subpoena or order relating to paternity or child support proceeding)
Rule 31(a) and (b): Editing changes: minor revisions are proposed 10 provide
clarify and consistency.

Rule 32 (Failure to answer charges)
rr

Rule 32(a) and (b):

Substantive change; Rule 32 is new. These subsections

provide that a respondent's failure to answer charges constitutes an admission of the
allegations, and that failure to appear before a. screening hearing panel, after actual
receipt of notice, constitutes an admission of the allegations under consideration or
concession of the motion or recommendations under consideration. These changes are
based in iarge part on the corresponding ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement. The proposed Rule also requires good cause to delay proceedings
because of a. respondent's failure to appear.

WHEREFORE, the Utah State Bar requests the Court to approve the changes to
the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability as set forth above and reflected in the
rediine version of the Rules contained in the addendum.
Dated this £$

a ay of February, 2002.

Katherine A. Fox
General Counsel
r-ox/PETITJONRLDD

38

/

